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Abstract
Transitional justice is affected by the moment it emerged in the international system,
the post-Cold War era. Its form was distorted by the international context into which
it was born: the dissolution of the bipolar Cold War political order, the triumph of the
United States as the world’s sole hegemon, and the cascading wave of liberalization
that crashed across the globe. Transitional justice was shaped by this political
moment, as it absorbed important tenets of liberal internationalism. Transitional
justice also helped shape this political moment, as it became a solution to the problem
that illiberal non-democratic, conflicted states pose to the success of the liberal
internationalist vision. The result is that considerations in transitional justice that
should have intrinsic merit, including the ‘local,’ the ‘victim’ and indeed, ‘justice’,
become instrumentalized in the service of this overarching liberal social project.
Ultimately, transitional justice fails to realize its emancipatory potential.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

“Memory, itself, is a disciplinary mechanism... it selects for what is important (the
histories of triumph), it reads a continuous narrative into one full of ruptures and
contradictions, and it sets precedents for other ‘memorializations.’” 1
The transitional justice moment has truly arrived. From its humble origins as a
nameless literature at the margins of disparate fields, transitional justice has become a
coherent field of scholarship, policy, and practice. It has made meaningful strides
towards inclusion in the normative workings of the international system. Transitional
justice has succeeded in creating a vast and expanding academic and practical
literature, and marshalled a dedicated following of scholars, practitioners and
policymakers to its cause. Counted amongst its adherents is Kofi Annan, the former
Secretary General of the United Nations. In a Report of the Secretary-General to the
United Nations, Annan established his commitment to the field, as transitional justice
is “essential to… the international community’s efforts to enhance human rights.”2
For Annan, transitional justice is one “mutually reinforcing imperative” alongside
long-standing international commitments to peace and democracy.3 This high level of
rhetorical dedication has been matched by an incredible amount of expenditure and
practical implementation.4 No less than thirty-five countries have implemented truth
commissions to investigate mass atrocity; the hallmark International Criminal
Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia occurred; and the ratification of the Rome
Statute constructing the International Criminal Court (ICC) stands as a crowning
achievement of transitional justice discourse and doctrine. 5 Indeed, a veritable
transformation has occurred under the auspices of transitional justice.

1
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The fact that this expansion occurred in such a compressed time frame, a mere
25 years, is remarkable. More remarkable, still, is the crossroads at which transitional
justice now finds itself. The correct posture of transitional justice in relation to states,
institutions and the international community is the topic of heated debate. Granted,
the tone of these discussions is not always critical. Often, these debates can take the
shape of practical ‘internal’ disagreements, concerning the proper sequencing of
mechanisms or the right manner in which to deal with questions of sovereignty. In
this case, the terms of the debate are confined to the bounds of transitional justice
practice. There are, however, growing concerns about the value and vision of
transitional justice as an enterprise. For some, the rapid enlargement of transitional
justice has presented a ‘paradox of success,’ whereby the field is left vulnerable to
failure, manipulation and critique.6 In the policy realm, there is reason to believe that
the swift acceptance and application of transitional justice has presented practitioners
with a dilemma as the paradigms they hope to implement are insufficiently
theorized. 7 On the theory side, a growing chorus of critical scholars has begun to
challenge the normative aspects of the field, mounting incisive criticisms of the aims,
ambitions and assumptions undergirding transitional justice practice. 8 This thesis
finds its grounding in this comprehensive critical reflection on the field. In the midst
of this ‘premature midlife crisis,’ an examination of the core assumptions and
practices of transitional justice is timely.9 The intended aim of this research is not to
discard the theory and practice of transitional justice wholesale, but rather to subject
the framework that underlies transitional justice to further scrutiny. Laying bare the
problematic assumptions that frame the transitional justice enterprise presents the
opportunity for change, and opens a space to imagine transitional anew.
Here, a brief primer on transitional justice is necessary. As the breadth of
transitional justice has widened over the course of the past two decades, the meaning
Lauren Marie Balasco, “The Transitions of Transitional Justice: Mapping the Waves from Promise to
Practice,” Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (2013).
7
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8
Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’”
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2008), 13.
9
Ibid.
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of the term itself has also considerably broadened. 10 What began as a literature
primarily concerned with transitions from authoritarianism to democracy now
commands a prolific literature on intractable civil conflict, humanitarian crisis and
international intervention.11 As the post-Cold War era presented new challenges to the
attainment of transitional justice goals, these issues were woven into the definition of
transitional justice itself. What is central to all of these meanings is the concept of
‘transition,’ which implies a linear progression from one state of being to another:
usually from war to peace or from authoritarianism to democracy.12 Joanna R. Quinn
identifies four strands of consideration in transitional justice canon, each with its own
set of paradigmatic debates: memory and remembering, truth, peacebuilding and the
transformation of institutions, and forgiveness.13 According to Quinn, all four strands
of transitional justice analysis coalesce around a desire for reconciliation, which is a
dynamic process of rebuilding society after mass atrocity. 14 Transitional justice
theory, then, is concerned with the philosophy, politics and pragmatic aspects of
‘transition’, an extended meditation on the question of “how to approach the past.”15
But there is more. Chandra Lekha Sriram argues that transitional justice is
also an “active domain of policy,” which is practiced by the United Nations,
supported by NGOs, and bilateral donors.16 This is because processes of transition are
understood to be traumatic, raising “fundamental issues regarding law, morality and
politics,” as societies struggle to “find solutions to legacies of violence.”

17

Undergoing a ‘transition’ produces “resulting questions of justice,” which the
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4
introduction of transitional justice mechanisms are meant to address. 18 These
mechanisms can include any combination of trials, truth commissions, lustration,
amnesty and pardon.19
These mechanisms are themselves representative of certain paradigmatic
debates within the field of transitional justice, about the relative primacy of truth or
peace in relation to justice. These paradigmatic differences are the result of the
divergent silos of knowledge from which transitional justice emerged. According to
Christine Bell, transitional justice is caught in a contest between competing aims,
including “an ongoing battle against impunity rooted in human rights discourse; a set
of conflict-resolution techniques related to constitution-making; and a tool for
international state-building in the aftermath of atrocity.” 20 In order to gain a clear
view of the field, I will now consider each of these paradigms in turn.
The three foundational paradigms of transitional justice are retributive,
restorative and reparative. The retributive paradigm in transitional justice takes its
start from the foundational underpinnings of the criminal justice system in many
Western countries. It begins with the assumption that “someone who has done wrong
should suffer some penalty as a result of what he has done because that suffering is
the appropriate consequence to him of the wrongdoing for which he is responsible.”21
There are varying rationales for the retributive paradigm, but they usually include the
public acknowledgement of wrong-doing, the punishment of the perpetrator, a
reverberating educative effect for the public, a reinforcement of the ‘rule of law,’ and
a restored legitimacy in the legal institutions. 22 Those that follow the retributive
paradigm are likely to advocate for the use of trials and tribunals as transitional
justice mechanisms, acting in the name of formal, institutional justice.
The restorative justice paradigm takes a rather different approach to the
retributive paradigm, rather than punishing the perpetrator it seeks to “restore both the
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victim and perpetrator of crimes back into harmony with the community.”23 There are
three rationales for restorative justice: a focus on harm, the conception that harm
results in obligations to society and victims, and that it promotes engagement or
participation.24 The primary mechanism following from the restorative approach has
been one of the most successful, the truth commission. Here, pardon in the name of
‘settling accounts’ of the truth is common. This is because the aim of the restorative
paradigm is fundamentally non-retributive; it takes its strength from stitching social
ties back together again.
The reparative justice paradigm is centered on the concept of ‘repairing’ that
which was broken within the community in order for the mass violation of human
rights to have occurred. While also a critique of the retributive paradigm, it is more
concerned with “making right what went wrong,” in materially and symbolically
ways. 25 There are three rationales for reparative justice: “restoring the rule of law
through reforms to prisons, police and judiciary; rectifying human rights violations
through trials, reparation and traditional mechanisms; and redressing the inequalities
and distributive injustices that underlie war.”26 This is a more structural approach to
transitional justice than the one advocated by either the retributive and restorative
paradigms, and as such, is more capable of addressing the grievances that caused and
exacerbated conflict in the first instance.
These paradigms may seem quite different at first glance, but I argue that their
end goals are indistinguishable. The retributive, restorative and reparative paradigms
may offer different diagnoses of the social ills and prescribe divergent mechanisms,
but they envision an identical social and political world. This is true whether the
scholars are interested in trials or truth commissions as instruments to bring about this
political world, or paradigmatically focused on retribution or restoration. Transitional
justice scholars see the proper political alignment as one informed by liberal
democracy, a liberal citizenry and a social world constituted by the specific civic
virtues of toleration, equality and rule of law. Therefore, the distinction between these
Joanna Quinn, ‘Transitional Justice,’ 333.
Howard Zehr, Little Book of Restorative Justice (United States: Good Books, U.S., 2002), 23-24.
25
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26
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paradigms is a difference of process, or the manner of bringing about the world these
scholars envision. The goals of transitional justice include establishing the rule of
law, accountability, and democracy, but there are more. 27 Martha Minow outlines
several “overlapping aspirations” of transitional justice including the end of violence,
overcoming denial, promoting reconciliation and psychological healing, punishing
and excluding perpetrators, renouncing atrocity, and building an international order to
prevent and respond to atrocity.28
I began this study by considering the margins of transitional justice, and the
opportunities available for subaltern actors and populations to ‘make’ transitional
justice as they see fit. Essentially, I considered the possibility and method of agency
in the face of hegemonic constraints presented by transitional justice discourse and its
institutions. While Antonio Gramsci coined the word ‘subaltern,’ my consideration of
the subaltern subject in transitional justice followed from the assumption and
redeployment of the concept from postcolonial scholars such as Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak and Ranajit Guha.29 In this tradition, the concept of the subaltern retained its
emphasis on “people in a particular society suffering under hegemonic domination,”
but was considerably widened. Scholars such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak included
include the racialized international division of labor, and added the critical dimension
of ‘voice.’ 30 The subaltern is a subject, constituted and created by the hegemonic
forces which she endures. The subaltern is characterized by an ‘inability to speak,’ a
subordination that subalterns can subvert through acts of resistance or partial
acceptance. Scholars of Subaltern Studies emphasize the situational nature of
subalternity, which allows for its consideration outside of considerations strictly

See Padraig McAuliffe, “Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect Couple or Awkward
Bedfellows?,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2, no. 02 (2010), James A. McAdams, ed.,
Transitional Justice and the Rules of Law in New Democracies (United States: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1997).
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Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 88.
29
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Ranajit Guha, The Small Voice of History: Collected Essays, ed. Partha Chatterjee (India: Permanent
Black, 2009); Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., Selected Subaltern Studies (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
30
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related to class struggle.31 The subaltern intersects with transitional justice at many
interfaces, but most importantly, the subaltern is often constituted as a subject: the
victim-subject and the ‘local’-subject, are two constructions investigated in this
thesis. As the ‘international community’ dictates and bounds the process of
‘transition,’ the study of the subaltern lends itself well to critiquing the undergirding
assumptions embedded in transitional justice literature. However, I found that the
study of hegemonic constraint in transitional justice is a burgeoning field, full of
possibilities for deep inquiry independent of its relation to the figure of the subaltern.
Examining the extent, shape and motivations for these specific constraints then
became the theoretical focus of this thesis, with the subaltern a strong undertone in
my analysis.
Hegemony, here, will be considered in the Gramscian sense, in which a social
group gains power through the twin forces of physical force and ‘leadership’.
According to Douglas Lidowitz, Gramsci’s model of hegemony involves the “subtle
dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and natural, to the
point where the dominant beliefs and practices become and intractable component of
common sense.”

32

For our purposes, the assumption of democratization and

liberalization as features of ‘common sense’ can be seen as evidence of hegemony.
I argue that the shape of transitional justice is molded by the moment it
emerged in the international system, the post-Cold War era. Its form was distorted by
the international context into which it was born: the dissolution of the bipolar Cold
War political order, the triumph of the United States as the world’s remaining world
hegemon, and the cascading wave of liberalization that crashed across the globe.
Transitional justice was shaped by this political moment, as it absorbed important
tenets of liberal internationalism and the need for liberal democratic states.
Transitional justice also helped to shape this political moment, as it became a solution
to the problem that illiberal non-democratic, conflicted states pose to the success of
the liberal internationalist vision. Transitional justice adopts a particular posture, here,
as a social project. It becomes hegemonic, because it is tooled in service to an
31

Ibid.
Douglas Litowitz, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2,
no. 1 (2000), 515.
32

8
“interlocking system of ideas which persuades people of the rightness of any given
set of often contradictory ideas and perspectives.”33 It becomes a radical project of
social reshaping, to suit the ends specified by its assumptions. The result is that
considerations in transitional justice that should have merit on their own terms,
including the ‘local,’ the ‘victim’ and indeed, justice, become instrumentalized in the
service of this overarching liberal social project.
The first chapter of this thesis, “Locating Transitional Justice in Historical
Perspective,” evaluates the orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice
onto the international stage. The orthodox transitional justice origin story begins with
the post-World War II era, and particularly focuses on the Nuremberg trials. The
story goes that from this auspicious start, transitional justice was mired in its tracks
by the Cold War bifurcation of the international system. By the end of the Cold War,
there was a normative ‘justice cascade’ which was then allowed for the renewal of
transitional justice on the world stage. This narrative, however, falls prey to several
challenges.
My main challenge to the transitional justice origin story is the assumption
that the imputed significance of Nuremberg for transitional justice scholars aligns
with the actual experience of the Nuremberg trials for contemporary actors and states.
The ‘Nuremberg legacy’ ascribes to the Nuremberg trials an interest in diminishing
the power of state sovereignty, when I argue the opposite was the case. I demonstrate
that the Nuremberg trials and the Allied occupation of Germany post-WWII was
legitimized through the active exercise of sovereignty. My critique has two
consequences: first, it casts doubt on the veracity of the transitional justice origin
story. But, second, it allows for the relocation of the ‘emergence’ of transitional
justice to a more fitting place: the post-cold War moment. This places transitional
justice discourse in dialogue with the geopolitical and ideational changes that were
occurring at this time, and permits analysis of transitional justice alongside
democracy promotion and liberal peacebuilding.
“Transitional Justice: Fashioning the Liberal Democratic Polity?” is the
second chapter of this thesis. I take “who is transitional justice meant to serve?” as the
33
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guiding question of this chapter, and from this perspective I consider the implications
of embedding the objective of liberal democracy in the core of the transitional justice
enterprise. The dominance of the democratic peace thesis in considerations of
transitional justice is clear, there is an assumption that democratic states are
inherently peaceful and therefore the construction of liberal democratic states in
transitional societies is of paramount importance. I argue that this claim is
unsubstantiated, as the democratic peace thesis makes a contested claim on the
likelihood of violence between democratic states, rather than the intrastate conflict
that is most likely to wrack transitional states. As a result, I argue that the democratic
peace thesis is a faulty basis from which to begin transitional justice initiatives.
I also consider, here, the reasons for the centrality of the democratic peace
thesis to transitional justice. First, I argue that transitional justice’s democracy
imperative shares troubling resonances with modernization theory, with liberal
democracy taking the mold as the unitary form of modernity to which nondemocracies must conform. Second, I posit that the construction and expansion of
liberal spaces is taken as a security prerogative for liberal democratic states in the
liberal internationalist paradigm, as “liberals do not merely distrust what [nondemocracies] do; [they] dislike what they are.”34 This security dilemma is combined
with the particular features of the moment of transitional justice’s emergence onto the
world stage, which provided an unprecedented amount of intervention for the United
States, the world’s premier liberal internationalist hegemon. The advent of
transitional justice coincided with unipolar American hegemony, the ideological
triumph of liberal internationalism in the world system, and the proliferation of liberal
peacebuilding theory and practice. Together, this indicates that transitional justice
practice lays a foundation for the creation and maintenance of liberal spaces across
the world. By defining-in democracy to transitional justice enterprise, the possibility
of alternative forms of governance is barred from the start. And yet, the rationale
behind this democratizing imperative is fundamentally about the ontological threat
that non-democracies pose to liberal democratic states, not the transitional states

34
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themselves. This tension, if left unresolved, points to the entanglements of transitional
justice with hegemonic forces in the globe.
The third chapter, “Hybridity to the Rescue?” considers transitional justice in
relation to the rise and crisis of liberal peacebuilding and the turn to local and hybrid
forms of peace. Transitional justice rode on the coattails of the liberal peacebuilding
agenda, which in the early 1990s saw a rapid enlargement in funding, implementation
and optimism. In the name of a liberal peace that would envelop the globe,
international organizations waded into the murky waters of intrastate conflict. In the
face of repeated failure, it seemed the hope for a liberal peace was dashed.
After the ‘crisis’ that plagued liberal peacebuilding, to which transitional
justice was intimately tied, there was a turn towards the ‘local’ which had a marked
impact on transitional justice thought and practice. I argue that the turn towards the
local was affected by two problems: the problem of knowing the local and the
problem of local knowledge. The problem of knowing the local is the essentialized
portrait of the ‘local’ that emerges from the instrumentalist approach that
peacebuilding and transitional justice scholars used in relation to ‘transitional’
societies. Here, a binary opposition is drawn between the ‘local’ and the
‘international,’ with problematic results. This leads to the problem of local
knowledge, which is the process by which an artificial script and understanding of the
‘local’ is produced that can be translated into the language of technocratic solutions.
From this grounding, I then analyze the ways that these problematic assumptions can
impact the interfaces at which the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ interact in transitional
justice: hybrid tribunals and customary justice mechanisms. Ultimately, I argue that
hybrid attempts at transitional justice fails to escape the problematic logic of the
liberal peace. In the name of hybridity, I argue, transitional justice assumed a new and
more ‘legitimate’ shape.
“Constructing the Victim, Settling Accounts” is the final chapter of this thesis.
Finally, I consider the construction of victimhood in transitional justice, the manner in
which the ‘victim’ is instrumentalized, and the neutralization of contesting narratives
of victimhood through truth commissions. I attempt to deconstruct the sanitized
dichotomy between ‘vicim’ and perpetrator’ in order to understand how these

11
narratives can obscure the messy realities of protracted conflict and depoliticize
actors who navigate conflicted spaces. I also challenge the politics of ‘invoking the
victim,’ or claiming the best interest of the victim to pursue certain ends.
The process of ‘settling accounts’ through the transitional justice mechanisms
of truth commissions can have a silencing effect on victim narratives that are left out
of the fold. Although transitional justice aims to deal with the past, the realities of
conflict can produce multiple, contradictory narratives of war time. The processing of
these truths to create a singular Truth is ultimately a hegemonic act. Here, I consider
the importance of this process to the state and nation-building project, even as it can
come at the expense of victims. Ultimately, through authoritative appeals to the
Truth, truth commissions can cement in place the same unjust political dynamics that
propagated the conflict that made them necessary.
The current shape of transitional justice is an attempt to distill diverse political
forms into the liberal mode, to produce ready-made toolkits in response to atrocity,
and to tacitly accept hegemonic circumstances to shape and define the transitional
justice project. This cannot be allowed to stand. It is clear that foreclosing the search
for justice to those options manicured and preferred by the international community is
a sorry answer to the challenges presented after conflict ends. In this single-minded
pursuit, transitional justice fails its emancipatory potential, which is among the most
important assets it possesses. Critical examinations of the field, such as this one, can
allow transitional justice to imagine itself anew.
The methodology employed by this thesis is a discourse analytic
methodology. Inherent to this enterprise is an understanding of the way that
knowledge production, and its historical legacy, shapes and reshapes political
landscapes. In this respect, I concur with the conclusion of Phillips and Hardy that
“[w]ithout discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse,
we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves.” 35 Indeed, this
understanding is crucial to our understanding of political dynamics. The creation of
meaning, Murray Edelman argues, is “[t]he critical element in political maneuver for

35
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advantage…”36 As meaning is construction, our understanding of the precise contours
of amorphous concepts such as ‘peace,’ ‘conflict,’ and ‘justice’ become
instrumentalized and deployed through policy. Any attempt to understand these
dynamics, then, must begin with the deconstruction of the concepts themselves.

Murray Edelman, “Political Language and Political Reality,” American Political Science Association
18.1 (1985): 10.
36

13

Chapter 2

2

Locating Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective

An issue of central concern in the transitional justice literature is the problem of ‘the
past,’ and how it might best be ‘reconciled,’ ‘acknowledged,’ or ‘dealt with.’ And yet,
efforts to historicize transitional justice itself, as a coherent and bounded discipline,
have been rather scant. There is a transitional justice ‘origin story,’ that is often taken
at face value. As this orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice is
intimately tied to its normative aims, it is incredibly important to subject this origin
story to scrutiny. Transitional justice literature anchors itself in seminal moments in
the evolution of the modern state system, such as the Nuremberg trials. This origin
story serves an important legitimizing function for the discipline, as it can then refer
to the creation of the contemporary international system for its precedent. With
further analysis, this orthodox narrative proves to be ahistorical in nature, as it relies
on a revisionist interpretation of the motives and actions of states and policymakers in
the post-World War II era. Rather than relying on this interpretation of transitional
justice history, this chapter argues that transitional justice as a field is a much more
recent invention, becoming a concretized field only in the immediate post-Cold War
era. Situating transitional justice in the post-Cold War era offers the opportunity to
analyze its emergence in conjunction with other concurrent hegemonic discourses that
captured the international spotlight at the same moment.

2.1 Evaluating the Transitional Justice Origin Story
The exact historical moment that scholars determine to be the ‘start’ of transitional
justice is largely a function of whether they view transitional justice as a distinct
product of the modern era, or a regularly occurring process that spans the expanse of
time. This illuminates key differences in definitional criteria, as some definitions
allow for transitional justice processes to be read backwards into history, while others
root themselves in specific historical moments.
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The boundaries of the ‘Universe of Transitional Justice’ are considerably
broader for John Elster than for other scholars, as he defines transitional justice as
“[t]he processes of trials, purges, and reparations that take place after the transition
from one political regime to another.”1 Rather than understanding transitional justice
as ‘emerging’ in a certain historically situated context, then, this definition allows
Elster understand transitional justice as a regularly occuring fixture of moments of
social transformation. Elster sets out to examine the ‘process of transitional justice’ at
work in the restoration of Athenian democracy in 411 B.C. and 403 B.C., as well as
the two French resumptions of monarchy in the 19th century. 2 In doing so, Elster
attempts to explain the ways that processes of transitional justice are different in
transitions from one form of governance to another, largely by containing the
normative aspects of transitional justice to the understandings of justice offered by
incoming elites.3
While Elster’s intended aim is to prove that “transitional justice is not limited
to modern regimes nor to democratic regimes,” he inadvertently demonstrates one of
the greatest challenges of the transitional justice literature: definitional ambiguity.
Where most transitional justice scholars would contain the bounds of transitional
justice to the latter part of the twentieth century, Elster achieves this extension of
transitional justice by removing some of the key assumptions of much of the current
field. By way of example, Elster does not assume that democracy is the inevitable end
of transitional justice processes. Certainly, the coherent identification of transitional
justice principles backwards into time forces one to reconsider the remarkability of
our present moment.
While Elster is a notable exception, there is an identifiable orthodox narrative
of the emergence of transitional justice in the international arena. This origin story
tells of a steadily evolving normative acceptance of transitional justice principles,
occurring in successive waves over the course of the twentieth century. Ruti Teitel’s
seminal “Transitional Justice Genealogy” is quite essential in outlining this position.
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Understanding this orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice is
critical to apprehending how the field of transitional justice legitimizes and
historicizes itself and its place in the international system. This section unpacks this
origin story, determines the reasons that this particular narrative is important to the
field, and considers the implications of marking a new ‘start’ to the transitional justice
project.
Teitel describes the emergence of transitional justice as occurring in three
distinct phases: post-World War II transitional justice, post-Cold War transitional
justice, and steady-state transitional justice. 4 Each of these distinct ‘phases’ is
understood to be self-contained, historically situated, and most-importantly,
progressing. The understanding of progression implies two things: first, that
transitional justice thought existed in a coherent way in previous iterations; and,
second, that the most recent forms of transitional justice are the result of continuous
and conscious assessment. Teitel repeatedly depicts each of these phases as
constituting a critical re-appraisal of the benefits and costs of earlier models. For
example, Teitel writes on the political transitions that occurred as a result of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, “the question confronted by successor
regimes was whether and to what extent to adhere to the Phase I model of transitional
justice,” demonstrating that she sees an educative effect emerging from successive
waves of transitional justice. 5 Perhaps the most significant of these legacies, for
Teitel, is the Nuremberg trials.
Teitel ascribes an incredible amount of significance to the Nuremberg trials
after the end of the Second World War. For Teitel, the particular combination of
attributes in the immediate postwar era served as a catalyst for the emergence of
transitional justice thought and practice. From this standpoint, the postwar global
arena was ripe for the emergence of transitional justice as it was characterized by the
triumph of international law, the concurrent codification of human rights frameworks,
and a willingness to appropriately ‘deal’ with the horrors of the Nazi regime. This
first wave of transitional justice, post-WWII transitional justice under Teitel’s model,
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was itself a repudiation of interwar justice. National justice of the interwar years was
“displaced by international justice” in order to guarantee the rule of law. 6 Collective
sanctions, such as those imposed under the auspices of the Treaty of Versailles, were
viewed as onerous, resulting in a “crude, undifferentiated impact” and were
subsequently abandoned. 7 This made way for the “liberal focus on individual
judgment and responsibility.”8
Ultimately, and perhaps most significantly, Teitel understands the Nuremberg
legacy to represent the emergence of an ethos of conflict resolution, a commitment to
liberal principles in matters of justice. As Teitel writes, “[t]he postwar turn to
international law… reflected the sense that the relevant subject of transitional justice
was an international legal response governed by the law of conflict.” 9 The
international community was charged with the protection of the rule of law, the rights
of individuals, and the duty to seek justice after atrocity. This implied a limit to
national sovereignty, and a strengthening of the role of the international in domestic
affairs. The importance of this legacy to the orthodox transitional justice origin story
cannot be overstated. Here, the Nuremberg trials are meant to demonstrate the
international system curtailing the power and hegemony of the state over its citizens,
providing the first check against state power.10 As a result, Nuremberg is seen to form
the foundation from which transitional justice theory and practice emerged.
According to Teitel, “by defining the rule of law in universalizing terms, it has
become the standard by which all subsequent transitional justice debates are
framed.”11
Teitel is not the only scholar to ascribe a “permanent and profound
significance” to the Nuremberg legacy.12 Minow couches her criticisms of the trials in
the observation that “once established, the Nuremberg tribunal and even the
‘somewhat nebulous’ notion of crimes against humanity no longer could be viewed as
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unprecedented.” 13 Minow cites a Nuremberg prosecutor in saying that “the most
important contribution of Nuremberg is the development of a kind of international
law that grows, and is always in the process of becoming.”14 And Neil Kritz, in his
important “Transitional Justice” volumes, also subscribes to this understanding of
Nuremberg-as-start—although by omission. Kritz provides a chronological
examination of transitions, yet no cases are selected for consideration that occur
before the end of the Second World War. Of the many cases selected to represent the
immediate postwar era, it is post-Nazism Germany that is first. This accompanies a
note that cites the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as a “major historical
precedent” for future transitional justice.15 This specific reading of the centrality of
Nuremberg is placed at the very core of the orthodox reading of the emergence and
definition of transitional justice.
And yet, the significance afforded to the Nuremberg trials by Teitel and others
is based on a reading of the trials that merits further scrutiny. Perhaps one of the most
significant imputed legacies of Nuremberg is the assessment that it encroached upon
the heretofore-sacrosanct boundaries of national sovereignty. In the orthodox
transitional justice narrative, national sovereignty is understood to have been an
impenetrable force pre-World War II. The Nuremberg trials are here understood to be
an important first challenge to this unquestioned preeminence. The opening of this
floodgate, then, later allows transitional justice mechanisms to address state atrocity
at the international level. As Martha Minow writes, “Nuremberg itself establishes
such international law that takes precedence over both claims of state authority and
claims of obligation under state law.” 16 Henry T. King took the argument further,
stating that Nuremberg “penetrated the veil of national sovereignty to recognize
individuals as having rights independent of nation-state recognition.”17 Nuremberg,
for many transitional justice scholars, functions as an opening salvo in a steady
13
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erosion of state sovereignty which would later allow the protection and assertion of
individual rights at the international level.
However, the Nuremberg trials did not represent an erosion of the potency of
state sovereignty. The four Allied Powers occupying Germany legitimized their
jurisdiction not through an appeal to the curtailing of all states’ sovereignty
(including their own), but by assuming control of Germany themselves and subjecting
Germany and German citizens to their control. This is clearly illustrated in the “Law
Reports of the Trials of War Criminals” selected and prepared by the United Nations
War Crimes Commission in 1947.
…[B]y the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the assumption
of supreme authority with respect to Germany, made in Berlin on the 5th
June, 1945(9), the four Allied Powers occupying Germany have assumed
supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers
possessed by the German government and any state, municipal or local
government, or authority. The jurisdiction of the British court, sitting in the
British Zone, could, therefore, also be based on the fact that after the
debellatio of Germany, the Allied Powers have been the local sovereigns in
Germany [emphasis added]. 18
Therefore, it was not through the desertion of national sovereignty, but
instead, the active exercise of sovereignty, that the Allied Powers justified their
incursion into domestic German affairs. John Laughland highlights this point by
arguing that the main charge leveled against Nazi Germany was that of starting a war
of aggression, which is essentially an indictment that the Nazis “violated the national
sovereignty of other states by attacking them.” 19 Other crimes that form the
centerpiece of modern recollections of the Nuremberg legacy, such as crimes against
humanity, were pursued in so much as they could be couched in terms of a war of
aggression. As Laughland argues, “Nuremberg reaffirmed the concept of national
sovereignty as the cornerstone of the international system, and as the main legal
bulwark against military aggression.”20
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The transitional justice origin story, ultimately, fails under the weight of further
scrutiny. It demonstrates that in order to conclude that Nuremberg represented the
erosion of sovereignty when the opposite was the case, transitional justice scholars
have had to actively reinterpret the meaning of this seminal moment in the modern
state system. This revisionism, however, serves a functional purpose for scholars of
transitional justice. All at once, it legitimizes their efforts, places the transitional
justice paradigm at the fore of the international scene, and places transitional justice
at the center of the new normative structures of the international system.
This interpretation of the Nuremberg trials uncovers an anachronism buried at
the heart of transitional justice that attempts to interpret meaningful moments in the
field’s past. Transitional justice scholars fail to recognize that the primary actors at
the inception of transitional justice history would not have described themselves as
doing anything of the sort. According to Paige Arthur, these scholars “imput[e] ideas
about ‘transitional justice’ to actors who… were unlikely to have held them.”21 One
might argue that this is no more than common social science practice. Ancient
Athenians likely did not anticipate the advent of liberal democracy although they are
partially credited for it. Similarly, the participants in the Peace of Westphalia could
not have anticipated the contours of the modern state when drafting their treaty. But
this argument misses the ways that interpretations of the past shape understandings of
the present.
We ascribe significance to these historical moments not because of what they
meant for the actors at the time, but because of the implications that those moments
represent for us, the readers of that history. It is true that Nuremberg did not mean for
the actors what it has come to meant for transitional justice scholars, and there is a
significant distance between the interpretation of these proceedings and the reality of
the trials. But the analysis must not stop there. It important to assess how this reading
of the Nuremberg trials shaped the eventual emergence of transitional justice, and
how interpreting Nuremberg in this way forwards the normative aims of the
transitional justice project.

Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009), 328.
21

20
It serves a functional purpose for transitional justice scholars to begin the
story of transitional justice with such an auspicious start. Jonathan Friedman makes
an important link between the inscription of history and the formation of identity. As
Friedman argues, “the discourse of history as well as of myth is simultaneously a
discourse of identity.”22 The construction of identity is formed through the discourse
of history, as “it consists of attributing a meaningful past to a structured present.”23
Here, the Nuremberg trials stand as a meaningful past, while transitional justice
becomes the structured present that requires explanation and legitimization. As
Friedman continues,
If history is largely mythical, it is because the politics of identity consists in
anchoring the present in a viable past. The past is thus, constructed
according to the conditions and desires of those who produce historical texts
in the present [emphasis added].24
Thus, transitional justice literature seeks to anchor itself in the Nuremberg
legacy in order to legitimize itself through that association. The Nuremberg trials
occurred during a time period that can be rightly characterized as the inception of the
modern international state system. Anchoring the inception of transitional justice to
Nuremberg serves to legitimize transitional justice theory and practice, such that it
becomes an ever-present aspect of the international community, a natural evolution
from the atrocities of the past. It serves as a referent for the social project of
transitional justice, legitimizing the specific visions of the role of the individual and
the international in relation to the state.
Thus, even as this reading of Nuremberg is removed from the complex legal
proceedings that bear its name, its importance lies in the significance attributed to it
by transitional justice scholars, and its role in legitimizing the transitional justice
project. This is where the notion of ‘progress’ in Teitel’s three-phase model becomes
incredibly salient. Even if the Nuremberg trials did not contemporarily represent the
curtailing of state sovereignty, the assertion by transitional justice scholars that it did
has had a marked impact on transitional justice theorizing from that moment onward.
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As Stéphane Leman-Langlois argues, this specific reading of Nuremberg was utilized
to shape further discussions on transitional justice processes moving forward. 25 It
formed the background of conversations regarding “justice after atrocity,” and
moving on from autocratic regimes. The Nuremberg model was thereafter both
revered for its role as a ‘fair trial’ and invoked as an image for “possible perils
embodied by conventional justice.”26 Thus, the question of where transitional justice
can be seen to ‘start’ is of more than just a passing significance. The transitional
justice origin story, flawed as it may be, has an active, purposeful effect on
transitional justice understandings of the present and future.
The hallmarks of contemporary transitional justice thought and practice gain
coherence in the post-Cold War moment. Indeed, as Paige Arthur argues, it is
significant that this is the moment in which the term ‘transitional justice’ is coined.
“The appearance and apparent acceptance of the phrase ‘transitional justice’ is… a
response to a set of new problems and a means of legitimating the practices used to
respond to those problems.” 27 These ‘problems’ that made the emergence of
transitional justice necessary are particular to the post-Cold War historical moment. It
is informed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the political
distortions wrought by the bipolar balance of power. It is also a response to the
triumph of the ideological persuasion of the world’s remaining superpower, the
United States. A wave of liberalization took hold across the regions that had
previously constituted the spheres of influence of the global superpowers. Thus,
transitional justice is intimately tied to the international arena in which it emerged.
This is important because it further removes us from the transitional justice origin
story, but also because it allows us to place transitional justice in a new international
context, in dialogue with different prevailing discourses.
Transitional justice was conceived in the post-Cold War era, but it also gained
immense political traction upon its arrival. This is evidenced by the incredible
expansion of scope and breadth of transitional justice literature at the end of the
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twentieth century. Teitel notes that transitional justice became more comprehensive in
scope, as it “became associated with the more complex and diverse political
conditions of nation-building.” 28 Tensions between amnesty and accountability
became pronounced in this phase, conceived as a contrast between the relative
primacy of truth or justice. Thus, the latitude of the project was expanded: it moved
away from offering judgment in particular individual legal cases to revisiting and
rewriting the past.29 If it is here that structural reconstitution of society became the
intended aim of the transitional justice project, perhaps this is a better place to ‘begin’
the transitional justice narrative.
Indeed, the normative frameworks that are associated with transitional justice
also come into being in the post-Cold War era. As Teitel argues, “the problem of
transitional justice was reconceived across moral and psychological lines to redefine
identity.”30 The mechanisms of transitional justice, meant to bring these normative
visions into being, begin to take root at that time as well. Of these mechanisms, Teitel
states, “these politics became the signs of an age of restoration of the rule of law in a
global politics.” 31 In the post-Cold War moment, the language of forgiveness,
reconciliation and acknowledgement were joined to one another, and the project of
‘transition’ defined.
Paige Arthur makes a compelling case that transitional justice emerged from a
crisis in the human rights community. Without repressive governments to “name and
shame,” Arthur argues, the end of autocracy across much of the globe forecast the
“los[s] of its central raison d’être”.32 As a result, transitional justice language was
mobilized to fill in the gaps, and to retool the existing human rights frameworks into
blueprints for transition. Arthur places an emphasis on transition as a concept in this
emerging discourse, and its appropriation form Marxist understandings of social
transformation to “technocratic approaches to engineering political change.” 33 The
endpoint of liberal democracy was integrated early and thoroughly, such that the
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normative goals of transitional justice lose coherence without its inclusion. Consider,
for example, the introduction to Neil Kritz’s edited collection Transitional Justice,
which argues from the outset that that the rule of law constituted a “crucial
component of both scholarship and practice in peacemaking and peacebuilding,” and
that rule of law was best achieved through democracy.34 Thus, it was in this period
that transitional justice as we have come to know it takes shape. The mechanisms that
we associate with transitional justice have been around for centuries, but the social
project of transitional justice relies on the emergence of post-Cold War discourses for
coherence. Indeed,
it is only recently that they have been justified through appeals to universal
norms such as human rights, or that they have been seen as legitimate only
when undertaken by a democratic polity, or that they have been seen as
having an underlying, determined connection related to the normative goal of
promoting democracy.35
The orthodox transitional justice history is told as an unfolding progress, in
fits and starts. A promising post-WWII era was frustrated by the advent of the Cold
War. The end of the Cold War coincided with a normative appreciation for human
rights and accountability, brought on by a ‘justice cascade’ that captured the
international scene. 36 However, for this narrative to hold, one must actively
reinterpret the meanings and significances of seminal moments in transitional justice
history, such as the Nuremberg tribunals. If one does away with this orthodox view,
however, one can more clearly view the political dynamics that led to the emergence
of transitional justice, and the form that it assumed upon arrival.
Ultimately, the contours and boundaries of transitional justice were molded by
the liberal internationalist global system into which it emerged. At the level of
abstraction at which much of transitional justice theorizing occurs, the literature can
be “ahistorical or decontextualized,” frequently treating concepts such as truth,
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justice, peace as “abstract and universal principles.” 37 However, in order for these
abstract and universal concepts to gain currency, they rely on the existence of preexisting discourses for comprehension and legitimation. This is why it is important to
reassess the origins of transitional justice, and to critically evaluate the origin story of
the discipline. To really apprehend the discursive precursors that influenced the
discipline that we now call transitional justice, one must have an appreciation of the
discourses that rendered it salient. Locating transitional justice in the post-Cold War
era allows one to appreciate the important corollaries to other discourses that served
as intellectual precursors to transitional justice theory and practice, such as
modernization theory, democracy promotion and liberal peacebuilding. These
relationships will be explored at length in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter 3

3

Transitional Justice: Fashioning the Liberal
Democratic Polity?

The ideological triumph of liberalism in the international system is all but
uncontested. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent ‘third wave’
of democratization, liberal democracy has emerged on the world stage as the
“preeminently acceptable form of governance.” 1 As a result, transitional justice
literature has entrenched the ‘universal value’ of liberal democracy at the very core of
its endeavor. In fact, the liberalizing aims of the transitional justice project have been
folded into the very definition of the subject. When Olsen, Payne and Reiter set out to
define transitional justice as a field, they remarked that the twin aims of the enterprise
were to “reduce human rights violations and strengthen democracy.” 2 Indeed,
transitional societies have been characterized as “emerging democracies” at least
since the publications of Neil Kritz’s edited volumes, which constitute amongst the
first coherent utterances of Transitional Justice as a coherent and discrete discipline.3
This chapter argues that the assumption of the end-point of liberal democracy
in the transitional justice literature has deeply politicized the field, tying the field to
the geopolitical, security, and socio-political aims of reigning hegemons. As a result,
transitional justice is divested of its emancipatory aims, and is reduced to a mere
technocratic approach favored by American and Western policymakers to bring about
the proliferation of liberal spaces. Democracy promotion, here, means more than just
the introduction of regular elections, although the transformation of political
institutions is an important feature of transitional justice efforts. The transplantation
of a ‘civic culture,’ replete with liberal values of tolerance, equality and participation
are also embedded in this framework.
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Taken as a whole, transitional justice literature takes the fittingness of liberal
democracy in transitional societies as a given. The end goal of any transition, as
dictated by the literature, is liberal democracy. This has numerous effects on
transitional justice as a whole. First, it fixes transitional justice in contentious and
paradigmatically partisan debates on the value, promotion and practice of democracy.
Second, it uncomfortably aligns transitional justice with the hegemonic aims of
American foreign policy. Third, it bounds the possible universe of emerging forms of
statehood post-‘transition’. Finally, it convolutes the aims of transitional justice that
are intended to have value on their own, such as reconciliation and forgiveness, into
means towards the end of democracy promotion and consolidation.

3.1 Transitional Justice and the Democratic Peace
When the United States Institute of Peace set out to complete a volume of works that
would become the conceptual framework for the field of transitional justice, the
tomes were suggestively titled Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies
Reckon with Former Regimes. To justify this framing, the editors argue that “although
in practice imperfect, democracy is by nature peaceful: on the international plane,
democracies generally do not wage war against each other [emphasis added].”4 The
democratic peace thesis, then, is invoked in order to justify the centrality of
democracy to the transitional justice enterprise. The following section considers the
democratic peace thesis, with an eye to examining its relation to transitional justice as
a whole.
Current articulations of the democratic peace thesis find their philosophical
precursor in the work of Immanuel Kant, and this idea is particularly articulated in
Perpetual Peace. The current formulation of the democratic peace thesis is that there
is a causal relationship between democracy and peace. As the argument goes, liberaldemocratic states do not fight one another, even if they may be warring with nonliberal democratic states. Thus, a “zone of peace” exists among states that are liberaldemocratic in nature, and conversely, that a threatening “zone of war” in states that
are not. As the democratic peace thesis becomes enmeshed in ‘policy relevant’
4
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technocratic language, “the prescription for more peaceful inter-state relations, then,
is to ‘just add liberal democracy.”5
The democratic peace thesis therefore acts as a barometer by which the
domestic affairs of states can be normatively evaluated. States that conform to the
liberal democratic ideal are considered ‘peaceful,’ whereas those that do not are
considered to be possible threats to international security. As Christopher Hobson
argues, “democracy has taken on the conceptual characteristics of “civilization”,
associated with notions of progress, development, modernisation and a host of other
laudable traits.”6 As an emerging standard of civilization, Hobson argues, states are
hierarchically rated on the basis of their ‘democraticness,’ which determines the
limits of international society as well as determining relations with those on the
outskirts. 7 This normatively laden standard “differentiates, evaluates, includes and
excludes... Those barbarians beyond [the bounds of civilization], however, are judged
and condemned as inferior, backwards and, often, dangerous.”8
This last point deserves elaboration. Reading the world as constituted by two
diametrically opposed world orders composed of a democratic “zone of peace” and
the non-democratic “zone of war” creates a security dilemma whereby the outright
elimination of non-liberal orders becomes not only possible, but necessary for the
preservation for international peace and stability.9 Thus, the seeds of bellicosity and
intervention

are

written

into

the

philosophical

underpinning

of

liberal

internationalism. As Linda S. Bishai argues, “intervention occurs both as a result of
the denial of status for so-called non-liberal states and as a result of the lowered bar
for military intervention by liberal states threatened by the refusal of non-members to
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join the liberal club…” 10 According to Hobson, the very existence of nondemocracies constitutes a threat to liberal democracies for two reasons. First, there is
the “behavioral threat” of failed states and rogue states that prevents the expansion of
the zone of peace. There is also, however, an “ontological threat” of non-democracies
as “liberals do not merely distrust what they do; [they] dislike what they are.” 11 Thus,
non-democracies are understood to constitute a threat to non-democracies. The
promotion and proliferation of democracy, then, becomes a matter of existential
concern.
This has very significant bearings on transitional justice. The wrongs
committed by previous regimes are often framed in liberal language that centers
individual human rights in opposition to state-sponsored authoritarianism. As well,
the challenges of that past that require acknowledgement and redress are often
understood to be problems wrought by insufficient liberalization. Transitional
societies, according to Juan E. Méndez, “have to reckon with the legacy of human
rights violations left by the recent authoritarian past. They all share this common
feature…”12 Neil Kritz also has something to offer on this account:
People had been ruled on a daily basis by violence, terror, and
division…civil trust had been impossible, economic opportunity crushed,
and congenial relations hard. With democracy in the air, there were
penetrating cries for retaliation against old rules and for revelations about the
past.13
Thus, it is the lack of democracy that is diagnosed as the main challenge, the
main impediment that transitional states have to overcome. This attempts to draw
from elements of the democratic peace thesis, in that the inherent peacefulness of
democracies could offer “rule of law” domestically to citizens. It is not just that
democracy is an end goal for transitional societies, but also that illiberality is
understood to have been a causal factor of the challenges a transitional society faces.
Against this backdrop, it is clear that if a lack of democratic principles and liberality
created these problems, only democracy can offer refuge.
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And yet, this reading stretches the democratic peace thesis to its conceptual
breaking point. As mentioned earlier, Kritz considers democratic states to be
“inherently peaceful,” but this claim is invalidated by the very thesis he invokes. The
democratic peace thesis makes a claim about the likelihood of democratic states to
fight other democratic states. It makes no claim whatsoever to preventing intrastate
conflict. Invoking the democratic peace thesis in this way obscures the actual nature
of conflicts in ‘transitional’ societies, and overlays normative prescriptions with little
justification, other than the paradigmatic predilections of the transitional justice
community.
There is also a significant pedagogical element to transitional justice’s
approach to democracy, which solidifies existing international hierarchies. As Teivo
Teivainen argues, democracy promotion “assumes the social function of the teacher
whose role is to instruct and guide the more child-like countries towards the path of
development.”14 This is also borne out in transitional justice works on democracy. For
example, Charles Duryea Smith makes the case that in the aftermath of the
dissolution of the communist world, emerging democracies “looked to the
democracies, especially the United States, for help in creating democratic institutions
and the complex foundation of a citizenry of democrats so necessary to traverse the
rough waters ahead.”15 Smith continues, “How, they asked, might we best inspire our
people with the habits of democracy and establish legal institutions and protect our
new freedoms?”16
The pedagogical inference of this statement is clear. Pursuant to the requests
of the newly ‘emerging democracies’ of the world, established democracies were
invited to instruct newly democratic nations on the creation and maintenance of
democratic institutions and citizenry. Indeed, the pedagogical impulse of the books
also extends to the intended audience and use of the volumes themselves. As noted by
the then-President of the United States Institute of Peace, their seminal volume of
collected and curated wisdom was meant to serve as “a standard reference for
Teivo Teivainen, “The Pedagogy of Global Development: The Promotion of Electoral Democracy
and the Latin Americanisation of Europe,” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2009), 163.
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governments, private organizations, [and] scholars” in order to “provide insights and
examples for leaders in emerging democracies as they confront the challenges of
transitional justice.” 17 Clearly, here, it is the role of established democracies to
demonstrate the ‘right way’ of performing democracy, for the benefit of emerging
democracies.
In some cases, the power hierarchies embedded in the teacher-student
relationship are lauded. In “Promoting Democracy by Example,” Loch K. Johnson
makes the patronizing case that,
studies examining how best to teach children to read uniformly conclude that
the most effective method is for children to see their parents reading… In a
similar sense, America’s democracy as often served as an example for other
nations, since the power of culture and moral suasion combine to make the
United States a showcase for those who aspire to modernize and
democratize.18
Reinforcing existing hierarchies through this teacher-student, or even parentchild relationship is deeply problematic and disempowering for ‘transitional’
communities, as it relies upon understandings of their inferiority and backwardness.
As the following section will show, the current democracy promotion frenzy lends
borrows heavily from the legacy of modernization theory, which itself rested on the
premise of a racialized international hierarchy of development.

3.2 Modernization Theory and Democracy Promotion
Democracy promotion has emerged onto the world stage with a significant force since
the fall of the Berlin Wall incited the famed “third wave of democratization.”19 And
yet, this model borrows quite heavily from the universalizing models of human
development that emerged in the twentieth century: modernization theory. Indeed,
modernization theory, democracy promotion, and, now, transitional justice, have
charted similar paths in their emerging trajectories. Modernization theory, just like
contemporary democracy promotion, emerged from the social sciences and found
adherents in American foreign policy circles. Through this migration, normative
17
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theoretical concepts were converted into technocratic language that was
instrumentalized through American foreign policy. This section will consider the rise
of modernization theory, its legacy for contemporary democracy promotion, and the
underlying assumptions that transitional justice has subsequently absorbed.
Modernization theory posits that societies progress through distinct stages of
socio-economic development. In the case of Walt Whitman Rostow’s seminal Stages
of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, he outlines five stages—
beginning with a ‘traditional society,’ through to a ‘Take-Off’, and concluding with a
drive towards modernity and an age of mass-consumption. 20 The process of
‘development,’

was

articulated

thereafter

as

an

attempt

to

encourage

‘underdeveloped’ states into ‘Take-Off’ so that they may join the international
community in enjoying the fruits of modernity. The end-goal of modernity was
ascribed the quality of a ‘standard of civilization,’ or, “the entry ticket to the
community of free and independent nations.” 21 Modernization theory was as
simplistic as it was prescriptive, constructing a single model of modernity from the
example of a handful of states, and attempting to export the model wholesale to the
Global South. 22 And the realization of modernity, it seemed, required allowing
Western states incredible amounts of penetration in internal affairs, as well as a
requisite free-market economy.
Fueled by a need to comprehend, and thus contain, rapidly shifting
circumstances in the international arena, the social sciences have long offered
technocratic solutions to emerging challenges. There are several legacies that
modernization theory has lent to transitional justice. The first legacy is the manner in
which social science literature unabashedly served the political ends of American
policymakers during the Cold War. Here, normative considerations were so immersed
within the modernization theory literature that these assumptions were uncontested,
and social science knowledge production was tooled toward providing pragmatic
frameworks towards the ends specified by American foreign policy. Second,
20
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understandings of progress were held as a ‘standard of civilization’ which
decolonizing states were meant to meet in order to be fully fledged members of the
‘international community.’ Finally, the threshold of international legitimacy,
inclusion into the ‘international community’ and indeed, eligibility for sovereignty
was predicated on meeting particular criteria. These aspects are integral to
understanding the hegemonic tendencies in contemporary democracy promotion in
general, and in transitional justice in particular. While there are noticeable
distinctions, these are distinctions of degree, rather than of kind.
The Cold War served as a “mobilizer of purpose” for American social
scientists. As Michael E. Latham argues, the bifurcated world system brought the
political dimensions of knowledge to the fore. According to Latham, the Cold War
constituted a “force that shaped [social scientists’] sense of themselves as producers
of knowledge and as part of the guardian class for liberal democracy.” 23 Thus, the
political implications and repercussions of their readings of political circumstances
were not hidden, but extolled. The disruptive and potentially dangerous challenges
presented by the decolonization of the ‘underdeveloped’ world, combined with the
looming threat of communist incursion motivated social scientists to produce “policyrelevant conclusions,” intimately linking “professional responsibility and patriotic
service to the state.” 24 As well, American policymakers keenly anticipated these
intellectual developments. The eventual emergence and domination of modernization
theory was finely calibrated to the environment in which it was conceived. As Nicolas
Guilhot argues, modernization theory acted as an ‘academic product,’ which
describes the “subordination of the field of the social sciences to the field of
[American] state power.”25 This means that the tools of knowledge production were
formulated by social scientists for consumption by American foreign policymakers,
adopting and shaping the policy agenda through the lens of the security climate of the
day. This fundamentally politicizes the substance of the knowledge that is produced,
and allows the incursion of American hegemonic interest in the academic arena.
23
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There is a relevant parallel here between the securitization of communist
states under the Cold War calculus with the securitization of non-liberal democracies
in the logic of the Global War on Terror. Under the Cold War logic, a fear of the rival
order of communism required containment, and, a “non-communist manifesto” was
the policy-oriented answer. In the post-Cold War era it was rogue states, failed states
and terrorism that captured the anxieties of policymakers. Ostensibly driven by social
ills including a lack of democracy, forceful intervention in sovereign territories and
the promotion of democracy became necessary. Democracy promotion became the
‘academic product’ suited to fit the job.
Guilhot considers the shift from modernization theory to the new doctrinal
paradigm of democratization to be an example of “continuity within change.” 26 Even
as policymakers in the Cold War era found the concept of democratization to be
momentarily out of reach of ‘underdeveloped’ states until they became
socioeconomically and politically mature, democracy was considered to be an
attribute of modernity.27 By the 1980s, scholars who challenged modernization theory
were at the forefront for the new theorizing of democratization. They argued that it
was modernization theorists who allowed authoritarian states to discard
democratization in favor of economic growth. 28 Indeed, many of these theorists
ironically derided modernization theorists as “‘social engineers’ who offered their
expertise on the assumption that economic modernization will foster democracy.”29
Instead, it seemed, they preferred to be surrounded by social engineers who offered
their expertise on the assumption that democracy would foster perpetual peace. In any
case, by the time that the Soviet system crumbled and the third wave of
democratization was underway, it seemed, democratization literature was already
undergoing an explosion.
Paige Arthur notes the move away from structuralism and grand-theorizing in
this era, and towards “technocratic approaches to engineering political change
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[emphasis added].” 30 The particular language of ‘stages’ was ejected, as was the
particular socioeconomic focus – states could be expected to modernize through elite
bargaining, institutions of the legal system, as well as efforts to constitute liberal
subjects.31 This is a matter of procedure and pacing, rather than a re-evaluation of the
problematic core of modernization theory. As Guilhot writes,
[s]evering the link between democratization and more encompassing
conceptions of social change, the literature on “transitions” to democracy
that they produced rested on a conception of negotiated, orderly and,
ultimately, manageable political change, kept distinct and separate from
socioeconomic transformations. 32
One important intellectual legacy that transitional justice draws from
modernization theory is the singular vision of modernity: a universal modernity
designed by Western states and transplanted onto states in the Global South. As Tarak
Barkawi argues, “[t]he bifurcated division of the world found in the [democratic
peace] debates reproduces older discourses of North-South relations: the claim that
there is a democratic peace rests on a Eurocentric conception of modernity.” 33 Uday
Chandra makes the point further, arguing that the Cold War distinction between
“modern Western and traditional postcolonial societies… mapped onto an older
binary between colonizer and colonized” and that these racialized influenced continue
to

hold

an

unfortunate

credence.
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“Modernity

and

democracy

were

unproblematically regarded as the province of the West. The postcolonial world was
imagined as its Other: rooted in the traditions of the past, socially and economically
backward, and unfriendly to representative democracy.” 35 Thus, hierarchies in the
international arena are reproduced through goal-setting practices, and the bounding of
possible outcomes in the international system.
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Another parallel between modernization theory and democracy promotion is
the emphasis on progress, a liberal vision of socioeconomic or sociopolitical
evolution. In modernization theory, this is demonstrated by the idea that
‘underdeveloped’ states somehow resembled industrialized states in earlier stages of
formation. A similar language is used to describe ‘emerging democracies,’ even if the
overt references have been tempered due to criticisms of modernization. The
discourse of democratization contains, within it, an implicit premise that westernstyle liberal democracy is the end stage of political maturity. This is manifest through
the language of the insufficient ‘consolidation’ of certain democracies, censuring
states for the lack of the rule of law or civil society—all implicitly using western-style
statehood as a standard of civilization.
This concept of progressive evolution adds another dimension to the binary
opposition between the democratic zone of peace and the illiberal zone of war. For
the zone of war, the zone of peace is meant to represent the possible outcome—
conforming with the demands of homogeneity imposed externally ostensibly allows
states in the Global South to join the elite upper echelons of statehood. For the zone
of peace, the zone of war represents a lawless barbarism—a disorder that needs to be
dramatically reconstituted internally, or reckoned with, with force. These discourses
are grafted temporally onto a linear vision of human evolution of development. Those
at the lower end of the developmental totem pole are meant to aspire to the highest
reaches, exemplified by the zone of peace. This pedagogical aspect of this binary
opposition demonstrates the hierarchical relationship between the zone of peace and
zone of war. As Barkawi argues, “the zone of peace shows to the zone of war its
future—if it embraces liberal democracy—whereas the zone of war shows to the zone
of peace its own recent past.36 Only with political and economic liberalization, the
argument goes, can a ‘transitional’ state be admitted into the zone of peace and
prosperity. 37 As I will now demonstrate, this fundamentally bounds the possible
outcomes of state formation in ‘transitional’ states.
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For all of the language of “freedom” touted by promoters of liberal
democracy, citizens of ‘transitional’ societies are decidedly not free in their choice of
possible state formation. The restriction does not only exclude non-democratic forms
of governance, but even democratic forms of governance that are not grounded in the
liberal tradition. A “narrow and settled conception of democracy” is upheld, based
primarily on procedural definition that privileges civil and political rights above
economic and social needs. 38 According to Barkawi, this ascendant “hegemonic
liberalism ‘defines out’ other historically valid democratic claims,” meaning that
there is a fundamental intolerance even for other forms of democratic expression.39
Thus, the tightly dictated ends of the goal of ‘transition’ are bound ever tighter, and
failure to pass this standard of civilization is enough to exclude a state from
‘international society,’ as well as inviting possible political and military intervention.

3.3 Constructing Liberal Spaces through Transitional
Justice
I have argued above that transitional justice has tightly bound itself to a problematic
and challenging discourse of democratization. However, I want to argue that
transitional justice has so enmeshed itself into this discourse that contemporary
transitional justice acts as a democracy promotion practice. That is to say, rather than
democracy simply being an important feature of transitional justice, instead,
transitional justice has become the handmaiden to the liberal project of homogeneity:
creating liberal spaces and liberal citizens in order to colonize the furthest reaches of
the globe with a “zone of peace.”
The language of transitional justice subordinates its goals to a wider project of
democratization; it makes the goals of transitional justice intelligible without
reference to democracy and democracy promotion. In this sense, transitional justice
becomes a how-to manual for the moment of ‘transition’—from current disorder to
democratic harmony. In many texts, the value of transitional justice is justified while
the implicit end-point of democracy is not, implying that the value of transitional
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justice lies in its ability to create better democracies. For example, Olsen, Payne and
Reiter set out to prove that transitional justice achieves a ‘justice balance,’ improving
human rights and democracy. They identified the problem as follows:
[Heretofore,] Scholars and policymakers have little systematic evidence to
support the claim that transitional justice actually brings improvements in
human rights and democracy. Second, if transitional justice does achieve its
goals, neither scholars nor policy-makers clarify when, why, or how it might
do so.40
There are two revealing statements embedded in this text. First, Olsen et al.
implicitly identify human rights and democracy as the goals of transitional justice by
using “democracy” and the “goals of transitional justice” interchangeably in the text.
Second, it is clear that scholars require evidence to substantiate earlier claims about
the value of transitional justice for human rights and democracy—demonstrating that
transitional justice was justified not for its own sake, but at least sometimes in the
name of human rights and democracy. This means that transitional justice is a means
to the end of human rights abuse and non-democracy, and not necessarily an end
itself.
This framing is all too common in transitional justice literature. Juan E.
Méndez identifies that the “the pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of
democratization,” as the pursuit of transitional justice “highlights the mental character
of the new order to be established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect
for the dignity and worth of each human person.41 Again, we see transitional justice
invoked as a technocratic means to the end of democracy. Transitional justice then
becomes embedded as a democracy promotion practice: a means to the end of
democracy.
The consequence of situating transitional justice within the remit of
democracy promotion is embedding transitional justice within hegemonic practices of
ordering the globe. Democracy promotion is currently at the fore of the international
agenda and it is heavily supported by the globe’s reigning hegemon, the United
States. Moving from the earlier discussion on the production of ‘policy-relevant’
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knowledge in social science communities, I want to deal here specifically with the
application of that knowledge. As the seeds of interventionism are buried in liberal
internationalist prescriptions, and as the democratic peace thesis justifies ordering the
world in “zones of peace” and “zones of war,” the practical consequence is the
creation of a democracy/security nexus. As Laura Zanotti argues, “liberal democracy
became a technology of international government of insecurity.” 42 This is because
identity-based discourses of danger permeate considerations of the insufficiently
democratic world, where “areas of instability are remapped in the form of
‘borderlands,’ characterized by disorder, irrationality and excessive violence.43 It is
no longer simply a conversation about the best form of organization of a state,
instead, it is the protection of “democratic culture” against an illogical and
threatening outside world.
Transitional justice becomes a manner of protection from the threat of the
rogue hinterlands. Often, this is in the form of political intervention, ordering
particular mechanisms for conflict resolution in the aftermath of mass atrocity and
conflict. But it also takes the form of military intervention, as exemplified by one of
the crowning achievements of transitional justice its short history, the doctrine of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which requires the intervention of states in cases of
genocide. As Mahmood Mamdani writes, “the new global regime of R2P bifurcates
the international system between sovereign states whose citizens have political rights,
and de facto trusteeship territories whose populations are seen as wards in need of
external protection. [R2P allows] the legal normalization of certain types of violence
such as Western counterinsurgency efforts, while arbitrarily criminalizing the
violence of other states as ‘genocide’.”44
And even when external intervention is not made primarily on transitional
justice grounds, transitional justice can still be of use. Mark Arenhövel earnestly
argues “after an external intervention, a coalition of states or the international
42
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community will often install mechanisms for transitional justice to build a sustainable
peace, stabilize the society, and foster democracy.” 45 Indeed, Rosemary Nagy
demonstrates who transitional justice scholars that deal with the invasions of Iraq and
Afghanistan under the banner of the Global War distort the narrative of ‘transition’ to
exclude the most immediate reasons for instability. Iraq “is constructed as being
‘from’ a repressive police state under Saddam Hussein,” and “Afghanistan is “‘from’
cycles of war and repression culminating in the Taliban regime.” Conveniently, this
sidesteps the question of foreign intervention altogether, and the accountability for the
instability is domesticated.46 Transitional justice becomes integral to the justification
for, prosecution of, and recovery from military intervention.
Transitional justice also attempts to constitute the ideal liberal subjects that
are meant to populate the emerging democracies. According to Neil Kritz, the rule of
law ensures a system in which “citizens may enjoy trust in their institutions and
among one another.”47 This dovetails with Christopher Hobson’s reading of the value
of the ‘rule of law’ and ‘civil society’ for democracy promotion writ large: rule of law
is intended to provide the procedural structures, while civil society “foster[s] liberal
democracy from below.”48 Fostering liberal democracy from below is an attempt to
transplant civic culture to the grassroots level, which is accomplished through the use
of transitional justice mechanisms. 49 There is a corresponding economic argument
forwarded by liberals, which addresses the value of liberal democracy for society as a
whole. Because liberal democracy makes few demands on its citizens, Patrick Deneen
argues, “it frees them to pursue private interests and to cultivate personal talents that
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contribute to great and growing prosperity across the society at large.”50 The social
and individual value of fostering the liberal subject, then, is multifaceted.
Cultivating the liberal subject also serves to solve the basest level of the
security dilemma posed by illiberal states. Laura Zanotti argues that “liberal
conceptions posit that security can be best attained by creating conditions under
which reasonable individuals can exercise liberties.”51 Thus, liberal subjects ensure
the security of the whole by being “simultaneously ‘disciplined’ and ‘active’ in
society.”52 The argument is that when democratic values such as toleration, respect
and the rule of law are deeply rooted among the populace the likelihood of violent
conflict will decrease. This means that democracy promotion endeavors curtail not
only the possible universe of state formations, but also the types of citizens meant to
inhabit these states.

3.4 Fashioning the Liberal Democratic Polity?
In the eyes of those who support transitional justice, democracy acts as a silver bullet.
All at once it is intended to ameliorate the social conflicts of the past, construct a
vibrant and participatory citizenry in the present, and pave the way for meaningful
engagement in the international community in the future. However, all of these hopes
are constructed atop a rationale for democratization that has little to do with the
particular society in question and everything to do with the preservation of stability
and order in the international system.
For all of the emancipatory language surrounding democracy promotion, it is
guided neither by the conflicted society in question nor with the particular society in
mind. The outcome of transitional justice processes in ‘transitional’ societies is preordained. Liberal democracy and a market economy become the default end-goal of
the transitional justice process. This severely circumscribes the possible outcomes of
transitional justice processes, as it limits the possible outcomes of state formations in
‘transitional’ states.
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The implication of transitional justice as democracy promotion practice
extends beyond its use as a vehicle for the political homogenization of the globe. It
challenges the emancipatory ideals upon which transitional justice girds itself. In the
field’s current state, the answer to all forms of mass violence comes in the form of a
limited number of external prescriptions. Those prescriptions have the possibility of
circumscribing avenues of justice and reconciliation that are most relevant for the
communities in question. Instead, what is offered is a sweeping project of social
engineering, meant to curtail the ontological threat of that state to others. The radical
nature of the transitional justice project is, here, taken for granted. Often, it entails
upending the political, social, and often economic structures of a society. And yet, the
needs and desires of the ‘transitional’ society, the focus of so much rhetorical
commitment and dedication, fades into the background when considering the
democratic peace thesis.
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4

Hybridity to the Rescue?

Even as liberalism has emerged triumphant in the international system, a stark reality
has dampened the hopes of a liberal peace enveloping all corners of the planet.
Intractable violent conflict, a lack of ‘consolidation’ of democratic institutions, and a
growing chorus of critics has humbled proponents of the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm. Hybridity is meant to be a solution to this challenge.

A search for

alternatives to this paradigm has led to the ascendance of localized initiatives in the
areas of peacebuilding, state-building and transitional justice. This has meant an
emphasis on customary peace and justice practices, the hybridization of liberal and
illiberal processes and practices, and an emphasis on local ownership of peace
processes. The underlying thrust of these approaches is an emphasis on ‘legitimacy,’
which is understood to exist in the domain of the local. This chapter argues that many
hybrid approaches to peacebuilding and justice share the same problematic
assumptions of liberal peacebuilding, and constitute a shift in procedure rather than a
wholesale reassessment of the challenge at hand. As a result, emphasis on hybridity
tends to “flatten out and even lose a clear sense of the coordinates of power relations
within and between global, national, and local orders.”1 Hybridity, this section argues,
does not escape the underlying logic of the liberal peace.

4.1 Faith, Frustration and Failure: Liberal Peacebuilding
in Crisis
Although attempts to precisely define the liberal peace fall prey to its diffuse and
ambiguous nature, it has a long philosophical precedent, stretching back to Immanuel
Kant’s Perpetual Peace. 2 It is constituted by an ideological commitment to
marketization and democratization, but either or both of these elements can be
privileged at a particular time. Messy constellations of hegemonic states in the Global
North, international organizations, and states in the Global South have taken up the
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mantle of the liberal peace. The aim of building a ‘liberal peace’ takes as an
assumption the “pacifying effects of open and integrated societies and markets
framed by a liberal state and international institutions, law and norms.” 3 However, as
liberalism is not monolithic, this agenda can have diverse and sometimes conflicting
manifestations.4 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks outline four main strands of
thinking that constitute the liberal peace framework: “the victor’s peace, the
institutional peace, the constitutional peace and the civil peace.”5 Victor’s peace is
premised on might, as “a peace which rests on military victory… is more likely to
survive.” 6 Institutional peace attempts to draw states into a normative and legal
contexts that determine their behavior nationally and internationally.7 Constitutional
peace rests on Kantian ideals and the democratic peace thesis, with the conclusion
that peace requires democratization, trade and a liberal polity. 8 Finally, civil peace
rests on advocacy and activism for the attainment of human rights. 9 All of these
interactive features of the liberal peace interact with the overall shape of the liberal
peacebuilding project.
Roger Mac Ginty offers an insightful conceptualization of the liberal peace, as
a “system of complicity and mutual interest.”10 According to Mac Ginty, this system
can be understood as “the coming together of hardware (states and institutions) and
software (the operating system).”11 Institutions are therefore programmed to pursue
liberal goals, which can be “updated to suit changing environments.” 12 This is why
ideas as diverse as democratization, marketization, the Responsibility to Protect and
humanitarian intervention can be housed under the umbrella of the liberal peace.
Thus, while these concepts can be traced to different initiating circumstances, the
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ultimate thrust is a liberal one, moving towards democratization and marketization.
These same impulses can be seen to drive much of the transitional justice enterprise.
Here, I want to offer a brief overview of the progression and pitfalls of liberal
peacebuilding in theory and practice. It will attempt to situate the ‘crisis’ of liberal
peacebuilding in historical context, so as to understand the consequent turn to local
initiatives.
With the encumbrance of Cold War geo-political bifurcation washed away,
the immediate post-Cold War era provided hope for a more proactive role for
international organizations in the maintenance of peace. The United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations launched fourteen missions between 1988
and 1992, and this trend was buoyed by seeming success in Namibia and Nicaragua
in 1990.13 This paved the way for a comprehensive vision of the role of international
organizations in warring regions. Discourses about ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’
became enunciated at this moment, best represented in the 1992 Agenda for Peace,
composed by Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In
Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali defined the “deepest causes of conflict” as
“economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.”14 A holistic approach to
peace was therefore necessary to address these concerns, which was manifested
through “four key mechanisms: the insertion of political and economic liberalism into
peace settlements; providing economic advise during implementation; conditionality
attached to economic assistance; and proxy governance.” 15 The orthodoxy became
that the quick transfusion of liberal institutions would pave the way for a sustainable
peace. No longer would the United Nations be frustrated in its attempts to proliferate
peace and development, instead, it would serve as the fulcrum of a “blossoming
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multilateral progressive consensus for peacemaking, development and social
justice.”16
This ambitious vision was almost immediately confronted with a series of
cataclysms in quick succession: in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans. Meera
Sabaratnam argues that these setbacks paradoxically bolstered the expansion of the
new peacebuilding regime. This is because “failures were rationalized through the
perception that the nature of conflict was changing from interstate to intrastate, and
into chaotic, unmanageable situations where state institutions had collapsed.”17 Thus,
while the budding hope and optimism that once drove the peacebuilding project was
being withered away by stark reality, the liberal peacebuilding project was still intact.
The emergence of a prolific literature on intractable conflict and ‘failed states’
also occurred at this moment, signifying an important discursive shift in academic
literature on peace and security. Sabaratnam argues that the categorical shift of states
from ‘transitioning’ to ‘failing’ signified a securitization of areas of conflict, and
exhibited a growing sense that areas of disorder were contaminating bordering areas
as they spun further adrift from state authority.18 The reemergence of ‘peace studies’
from relative obscurity and its fusion with ‘security studies’ reinforced the security
dilemma endemic to peacebuilding operations. And yet, from these diverse origins, a
common consensus emerged that only the liberal peace could address the problems
beset by warring states. Borrowing from the respective traditions of peace studies and
security studies, scholars and practitioners understood that “on the basis of superior
knowledge… and the use of force when necessary, the international community could
and should undertake more comprehensive and extensive interventions to secure
global peace.”19 Thus, the dismal realities of peacebuilding operations in these early
interventions actually served to raise the stakes of the importance of international
intervention and peacebuilding.
It was here that discussions on peacebuilding began to crystallize around the
importance of ‘good governance’ in order to steer post-conflict states out of a
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perceived downward spiral of disorder. At this critical juncture, the ‘holistic’
approach to peacebuilding found relevant parallels in discussions in development
circles, which were reeling from the failure of the Washington Consensus.20 If ‘state
failure’ was a poison that caused societies to disintegrate, then ‘good governance’
was the international community’s prescribed antidote. Weak state capacity was
understood to contribute to the challenges of order and stability in post-conflict states,
chief among them the “rule of law,” and thus, institutionalization was a necessary
remedy. According to Laura Zanotti, ‘good governance’ was understood to be a
universal good, comprehensive and predictable in nature. 21 In order to accomplish
this expanded vision of peacebuilding, a comparable expansion of the scope and
invasiveness of the international community’s role in conflict-affected states was
necessary. As Zanotti argues, “in addition to recommending reforms aimed at
building predictable, regulated and regulatory states… the UN had to equip itself with
the instruments for knowing, assessing and steering the behavior of states.”22 This
would require another yet enlargement of the role of international community, to
create the instruments that would assess the radical project of social reshaping that
was necessary for a liberal peace.
This “increasingly interventionist climate” was justified through a rethinking
of the concept of sovereignty itself, moving from a consideration of sovereignty as
the exclusive reserve of the state to sovereignty-as-responsibility.23 The formation of
the International Criminal Court and the adoption of the doctrine of Responsibility to
Protect are examples of this critical rethinking of sovereignty.24 Mark Duffield argues
that this constituted a reorganization of the international order as “a world of
contingent sovereignty,” where “the traditional national/international dichotomy has
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blurred.” 25 As a result, “the future lies in enmeshing ineffective states within
international public/private governmental assemblages having the developmental
technologies and ability to work directly at the level of populations.”26 intervention,
even trusteeship, was necessary to navigate conflicted states toward the liberal peace.
Transitional justice literature is an “integral element” of the liberal
peacebuilding project. 27 According to Chandra Lekha Sriram, “concerns for postconflict reconstruction have become integrally linked with a wide range of rule-oflaw programming,” and post-conflict justice.28 This is true both in scholarship and in
practice. The search for ‘holism’ in the liberal peacebuilding agenda allowed the
newly emerging field of transitional justice to ride on the coattails of the shifting
international agenda. Adam Branch makes an explicit connection between
international criminal law, liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice, as
“transitional justice has risen to the fore of the so-called ‘liberal peacebuilding’
agenda as part of the ideological framework for remaking societies.”29 Transitional
justice literature was adopted in the name of liberal peacebuilding practices, with the
goal of ushering in the ‘rule of law,’ an emphasis on democratization and the
democratic peace thesis with the end-goal of crafting a sustainable peace.30
Scholars and practitioners of the newly emerging field of transitional justice
largely supported the redefinition of sovereignty to one of sovereignty-asresponsibility, as the heavy intervention of the international community in domestic
affairs was a necessary precondition for transitional justice practice. Discourses of
trauma, healing, illness and recovery “were consistent with the medicalization of
‘war-torn societies’ as patients or wards of the international community, essentially
incapacitated and unable to manage.” 31 The core transitional justice concept of
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“remak[ing] post-conflict social relations and deter[ing] future human rights abuses”
became prominent discursive elements of liberal peacebuilding at this time.32
This deep integration of transitional justice with liberal peacebuilding meant
that transitional justice was not immune when a wave of critical scholarship
challenged the assumptions, practices and precepts of the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm. Roland Paris argues that the rapid liberalization that had been a
cornerstone of the liberal peacebuilding project “is capable of undermining the very
peace that it is intended to uphold.”33 Paris argues that the rapid democratization and
marketization attendant to liberal peacebuilding practice creates certain contradictory
‘pathologies,’ which frustrate the possibility for long-term peace. 34 At the same
moment, “work focusing on the political economy of war argued that war was its own
alternative system of profit, power and protection.”
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interventionist posture of the international community came under severe criticism,
considered to be one aspect of a considerable coercive apparatus constructed in the
search for the liberal peace. Mac Ginty outlines many charges against the liberal
peace, including claims that it is ethnocentric, elitist, security-centric, technocratic,
rigid, superficial, short-termist, neoliberal, and neo-imperial.36 With the onslaught of
theoretical criticism coupled with challenging reality, the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm was in crisis.
One of the main criticisms that was levied against international peacebuilding
lacked a basic element: legitimacy. By some accounts, the liberal peace was rendered
illegitimate because it “centered on imposing the Western model of the Weberian
state on those unwilling or not ready to accept it, and for whom it is thus ‘alien.’”37
Suthaharan Nadarajah argues that those who deemed the liberal peace illegitimate did
so on the basis that it favored “local ‘elites’ and international interveners, rather than
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the majority who bear the weight of both conflict and liberal peace engagements. In
this way, the latter are alienated from the state-in-formation, as they are alienated
from the elites who manage it with and for international peacebuilders.” 38 This
fundamental lack of legitimacy was seen to condemn the liberal peacebuilding project
to half-measures, superficial successes and ultimate disappointment. Legitimacy,
here, was understood as a value of confidence in the peacebuilding endeavor, the
assumption and ownership of a project by the population it is meant to serve. Thus,
when critical scholars launched a search for alternatives to the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm, it mainly coalesced around forms of peacebuilding that were considered to
be more innately ‘legitimate’: local and hybrid forms of peace governance.

4.2 Local Knowledge and Knowing the Local
Largely as a result of challenges experienced in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm,
scholars of transitional justice and peace studies have increasingly focused on the role
of the ‘local’ in determining whether interventions in conflicted societies will succeed
or fail. This is because legitimacy is understood to be principally in the domain of the
local. However, as the following discussion shows, this new focus on the ‘local’ and
‘legitimacy’ does not necessarily escape the problematic assumptions of the liberal
peacebuilding paradigm. This is because the role of the ‘local’ is often relegated to
procedural considerations rather than substantive ones. This is not to dismiss the
existence or utility of this paradigm wholesale, but rather, to question, “what are the
politics of invoking hybridity?” 39 As Suthaharan Nadarajah aptly notes, one must
“acknowledge hybridity’s potential for resistance and progressive agendas, but
question whether it can be always equated with these.”40
Thania Paffenholz argues that the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding occurred in
two successive waves, each with a different theoretical underpinning and
consequently different understandings of the ‘local’.41 The first wave emerged in the
1990s in the ‘conflict transformation’ school of conflict management as a response to
38
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the failures of peacebuilding operations in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans. This
wave of the ‘local turn’ moved into the orthodoxy of the international community’s
theorization of peace, as evidenced by the explosion of initiatives and funding under
the umbrella of ‘civil society’ and ‘local ownership’.42 According to Paffenholz, this
wave of scholarship “emphasized the necessity of empowering local people as the
primary authors of peacebuilding instead of externally designed and driven peace
interventions.”43 In this first wave of the ‘local turn,’ the question of ‘legitimacy’ was
of chief importance. There was an assumption that “only local actors from within the
conflict context would be able to build sustainable peace in their own countries.”44
According to this wave of scholarship, the international community was misguided in
their attempts at intervention as they were incapable of understanding the wants and
needs of the local community. The end-goal was effective collaboration between
these two groups, because “once the international peace builder has understood the
importance of the local, the latter can be more effectively supported.”45
By contrast, the second generation of the local turn operates from another
theoretical grounding entirely, it relies primarily on Foucauldian and postcolonial
understandings of hybridity. Authors such as Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond
conceptualize the local turn as a form of resistance against liberal peacebuilding, and
recognize local agency as constituting the building block of a post-liberal order.46
Local agency is understood to be exercised at all levels of society, it is inherently
counter-hegemonic. The local, here, means something qualitatively different than it
does in the first iteration of the local turn, here it is “defined in opposition to the
international” and constitutes a bulwark against the ongoing liberal peacebuilding
project.47
According to Oliver Richmond, a reformulation of the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm is tantamount to “old wine in new bottles,” and therefore cannot close the

42

Ibid., 867.
Ibid., 859.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., 860.
47
Ibid., 861.
43

51
distance between local and liberal politics.48 Richmond proposes a radical rethinking
of the peacebuilding process, with an eye to the inclusion of the ‘everyday.’ The
politics of the everyday does not focus on the practices and policies of elites, but
instead investigates how “people are able to adapt and take ownership over structures
and institutions, so that they begin to reflect their own everyday lives rather than
attempts at assimilation.”49 Through passive resistance, radical resistance, alterity and
subversion, local actors exercise agency over their conditions. This context produces
a liberal-local hybridization which, in certain instances, can be the foundation for
peace.50 While promising, this second generation of the local turn endures more in
scholarship than in peacebuilding practice. It is the first wave of scholarship, with its
emphasis on ‘local ownership’ and the involvement of local scholars that has had
more of an impact on peacebuilding as an enterprise.
The localizing efforts that swept transitional justice are almost entirely
indebted to the first wave of the ‘local turn’ scholarship in peacebuilding. This has
translated into a deep investment in discourses surrounding ‘local ownership,’
‘bottom-up justice,’ and ‘participation and consultation’ in justice processes. 51 The
contentious topic of debate, here, is usually depicted as a struggle between the
comparative value of accountability and objectivity provided by international justice
processes, and legitimacy and agency offered by local justice processes. However, the
transitional justice vision of ‘local ownership’ runs into myriad challenges. It creates
an untenable binary between the local and international, effectively discarding the
dynamism between the two. It effaces the power imbalances embedded in these
relationships in assuming that there could ever be a ‘pure’ local system of justice. It
also makes problematic assumptions about the relational value of the justice
mechanisms at both ‘poles’ of this dichotomy: the presumptions that the
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‘international’ offers objectivity, and that the ‘local’ is inherently legitimate runs into
serious challenges.
In order to understand the opportunities and challenges inherent to the local
turn in transitional justice, one must first deconstruct the concept of the ‘local.’ Here,
I analyze the construction and instrumentalization of the ‘local’ identity in
peacebuilding and transitional justice efforts, and consider the binary opposition of
the local/international interface, as well as the challenges of hegemonic dominance
within categories of the ‘local.’ While the newfound emphasis on local justice in
transitional justice is a welcome change from older, universalizing paradigms, it
presents a whole host of new challenges that prevent it from realizing the counterhegemonic ideals of its most ardent supporters. For all the talk of ‘hidden agency,’
subversion, and resistance, one must not lose sight of the continual presence of
domination, coercion and hegemony.
In order to integrate ‘the local’ into transitional justice and peacebuilding
exercises, one must have a malleable, tangible, concrete idea of what it means to be
‘local.’ In transitional justice, there is a distinct vision of the ‘local’ that is rife with
unsubstantiated assumptions with problematic outcomes. Here, the ‘local’ is the
opposite of the ‘international,’ and both concepts are mutually constituted through
their interactions with one another. As well, the local acquires ‘localness’ through its
interaction with the international, and vice versa. Here, the ‘local’ was understood to
principally constitute those at the middle level of society, as the “local is defined by
its peacebuilding potential.” 52 Clearly, defining the local in such exclusive and
instrumentalist terms divests subaltern populations of their agency and peacebuilding
potential. This section will unpack the concept of the ‘local’ and uncover the
problems embedded with conceptions of ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local ownership.’
Understandings of power, hierarchy and hegemony are defined-in to these relational
concepts, which frustrates the possibility of emancipatory hybrid interactions from
the outset.
The production, dissemination and instrumentalization of knowledge is of
utmost importance where it concerns ‘the local.’ As a matter of course, knowledge in
52
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transitional justice is often goal-oriented and pragmatic in nature, it is distilled into a
form that is amenable to “technocratic approaches to engineering political change.”53
One of the ways that the local turn in transitional justice has impacted upon the field
is to combat the universalizing, top-down approaches to knowledge in an attempt to
integrate ‘local knowledge’ into the fold. However, in order to do so, local knowledge
has had to be packaged and presented in a way that is amenable to blueprints,
checklists and practical agendas. A process is then undertaken by which local
knowledge is processed and judged useful. 54 This point is eloquently explored by
Suthaharan Nadarajah. Even when international peacebuilders, and by extention,
transitional justice advocates, attempt to resist the liberal peace, they must
…engage with and encompass these more ‘indigenous’ social forms within a
more nuanced and intensified power/knowledge framework, rendering them
knowable and amenable to international peacebuilding practices – albeit ones
now emphasising ‘empathy’ and ‘local legitimacy’, whether the local and
everyday form the basis for more effective statebuilding or an internationallocal peacebuilding ‘contract’.55
This has a dynamic influence on the content and meaning of the knowledge,
as it is grafted on to a pre-existing logic of social change. As Martin Nakata argues,
local knowledge “becomes not embedded in local meanings and contexts but
separated from its original context - an entity to be studied, worked on, developed,
integrated, transferred, and ultimately changed to fit another.” 56 Curating local
knowledge that supports the overall project of transitional justice, itself, then, cannot
be considered to be an inherently emancipatory act. Through this process of selection
and rejection, privileging and silencing, ‘local knowledge’ comes to be informed, and
indeed, defined, by the same hegemonic processes that it is meant to redress.
The ideas and values that one ascribes to the ‘local’ can also be a potential
pitfall in transitional justice and peacebuilding. Mac Ginty highlights a principle
challenge in ‘romanticizing the local’ in discourses that surround localizing efforts in
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peacebuilding. As Mac Ginty writes, “it is possible to develop a simplistic binary
narrative in which ‘indigenous’ and ‘traditional’ aspects of society are equated with
being organic, natural, unpolluted, sustainable, authentic and normatively good.” 57
This romanticization is particularly prone to occur when opposed to a caricature of a
malevolent and oppressive West, where complex dynamics are reduced to “saintly
locals and devilish internationals.”58 The essentialism intrinsic to this romanticized
portrait is ultimately destructive for many reasons.
First, it is an artifice. It paints an unreal and hyper-deterministic portrait of
relations on the local-international interface, which is a poor foundation from which
to comprehend a complicated web of histories, interests, individuals, and systems.
The simplicity afforded by this script is undercut when it is confronted with the messy
realities of lived experience in conflicted regions. It simply cannot capture the
complex ways in which people navigate conflicted terrain. With these embedded
assumptions, the blueprint for social change that is produced is likely to be
misguided, at best, and harmful, at worst.
Second, a romanticized vision of the local erases the existence of hegemonies
that exist within local communities, which is tantamount to reinforcing them. As Mac
Ginty rightly notes, many local approaches to peacemaking, and for our purposes,
transitional justice, are conservative in nature and strengthen the position of elites.59
The disenfranchisement of women, regional minorities, and those removed from the
reaches of power can be reinforced through the invocation and use of customary
practices. Simon Robins makes this case incredibly well in relation to post-conflict
Nepal. Robins argues that social exclusion in Nepal is reinforced through transitional
justice mechanisms, which “marginalizes victims and their agendas” and is
“dominated by a narrow legalism that neglects the priorities of victims.”60 The fact
that narrow legalism is a feature of human rights discourse and transitional justice
practice, Robins argues, allows local elites to translate the outcomes to suit their own
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ends. Thus, “the result of rights language in Nepal emerging almost exclusively from
dominant power groups is that it becomes an elite discourse.”61 Rights language is
“removed from the concerns of the marginalized and constrained by the political and
other priorities of the privileged.” 62 In sum, the particular plane of interaction
between the international and the local, here, results in the privileging of alreadyprivileged Nepalese. As Robins astutely notes, this is not a particular feature of
human rights or transitional justice, rather, “in an unequal society, human rights as
any other discourse will be articulated subject to existing power relations.” 63
However, a romanticized vision of the local is rendered entirely impervious to these
concerns. If this is allowed to occur, it is altogether possible that continued
oppression of subaltern populations would be shrouded in the emancipatory language
of resistance.
Finally, the romanticization of the local conceives of the ‘local’ as a distinct
unitary entity, universal across space and time.64 As Séverine Autessere puts it “the
definition of ‘local,’ like that of ‘peace,’ is constructed rather than given.” 65 This
means that the particular manner in which the local is constructed is illustrative of
undergirding assumptions and existing hierarchies. Autessere argues that the
particular construction of the local/international dichotomy is constructed with two
particular assumptions as basis. The first conceives of the local as “insular or
provincial,” which “ignores the fact that many residents of the host countries have
international knowledge and experience.”
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The second assumption is the

homogeneity of the local, where “the opposition between expatriates and locals is
central to the intervener’s way of seeing the world.”67 According to Autessere, “for
interveners, local people are the primary Others.” 68 This effaces the differences
between localities across the globe and even within the space of the local. It goes
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without saying that the politics of the local is historically and politically contingent,
as it encompasses as much dynamism as one can possibly conceive. And yet, the
image of the ‘local’ is contrasted against the ‘global’ in a simplistic binary, often
acting as a container of opposites to the construction of the global. It is crucial to
understand the source of this image, and its impact.
One reason for this binary between the local/international is a need for policydirected scholarship to make the local apprehendable, usable, and comprehensible.
This is because the local itself, as a concrete and bounded entity, is a necessary
instrument for peace in ‘local turn’ discourse. Indeed, just as in the case of local
knowledge, there is a pressing need to make the local, her customs, knowledge and
ways of being knowable and apprehendable. Predictability is necessary in order to
construct technocratic programs for social change. A homogenous image of the local
is predictable, even if it is false, and can thus be used to the service of pragmatic
social programming.
But there is another reason for this binary, and it strikes at the very heart of
the local turn in transitional justice. It can also be attributed to a deep-seated
incoherence in localizing efforts, which is a clash between the logics of the particular
and the universal. Here, the ‘global’ is universal; it is understood in terms of
ideological consistency, normative dictates and legalistic language that encompasses
the globe. For example, transitional justice literature addresses ‘victims’ and
‘perpetrators’ as coherent concepts, which attributes constancy to these categories
that can only be clear in the abstract. These categories are then applied, a priori, to
transitional societies. However, the ‘local’ is inherently particular; it is bounded in
place and time by historical trajectories, individual agency, narrative, language, and
memory. Attempts to make the local knowable to the global are ultimately acts of
translation. It is an attempt to render the local in terms comprehensible by those who
are not enmeshed in the particulars of a certain context. The romanticization of the
local results in a bastardized vision of the local, it is true, but a readable and
understandable one. Only when the local can be rendered intelligible can the
technocratic forms of knowledge that form the basis of transitional justice gain
credence.
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Many of the pragmatic attempts to comprehend the local circulate around a
central idea: legitimacy. In liberal states, the social contract is the source of
legitimacy that “binds elites and populations together.”69 Legitimacy in peacebuilding
is a prized, but often illusory, goal. Contemporary peacebuilding in the liberal mode
is understood to be in the midst of a ‘legitimacy crisis’ or ‘legitimacy lacuna’. This is
demonstrated by “cloistering offices in walled compounds with armed checkpoints,
using armoured cars and armed guards for transformation and protection… used to
impose a material and immaterial border and to increase distance between the
international and the local.”70 The lack of legitimacy for international projects is a
deep concern for peacebuilders and transitional justice scholars.
Legitimacy is understood to tie local communities to the transitional justice
project, incentivizing participation and investment in its tenets. If only local
populations could view the peacebuilding and transitional justice projects as
legitimate, the argument goes, there would be a marked success. The problem arises
when scholars then move to the realm of prescription in order to solve this legitimacy
crisis. They attempt to solve this problem by turning to ways to ‘generate’ legitimacy.
This amounts to mining ‘the local’ for its legitimacy which can then be grafted onto
existing peacebuilding and transitional justice projects.
The first problem is that legitimacy is understood to be derived from
‘representation’ and ‘ownership’ of peace processes by local actors. In order to fulfill
these roles, local elites are often conscripted to lead the charge, with questionable
outcomes.71 Legitimacy is not, and cannot, be automatically conferred on a project
simply by the fact of local integration. It is a multifactorial process of communities
coming to evaluate the fittingness, meaningfulness and utility of processes to their
own lives and to the community at large. Legitimacy is not an ingredient to be added
to peace processes to ensure their efficacy; rather, it is the outcome of communities
determining that peace and transitional justice processes pass the muster of
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community and individual needs.
The second problem with this technocratic approach to legitimacy is its
ultimate instrumentalization. Andrew Friedman demonstrates this by asserting that
the chief challenge facing localizing efforts in transitional justice is merely “to
determine where such local ownership may be inserted into transitional justice
mechanisms.”72 Local ownership, here, is grafted on to a pre-existing framework of
producing social change. Legitimacy is treated as a currency that can purchase
increased success for the transitional justice process, rather than an end itself.
According to Nadarajah and Rampton, “hybridity is… offered as potentially speeding
up implementation and local acceptance of neoliberal frameworks.”73 In the search
for pragmatic concreteness, legitimacy becomes an element to graft on to peace
processes to ensure their success, rather than a concept by which one can evaluate the
ethics of a particular practice. This mode of thinking is illustrated by David Roberts
when he poses the question, “if local legitimacy is lacking, how might it be
generated?” 74 Here, legitimacy acts as a means to rationalize and legitimize the
peacebuilding process. Instead of evaluating the reasons why local legitimacy would
be absent, instead, the focus is on engineering legitimacy in the service of
peacebuilding.

4.3 Hybrid Interfaces
Largely as a result of challenges experienced in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, a
growing number of scholars of transitional justice and peace studies have focused on
the role of the ‘local’ in determining whether interventions in conflicted societies will
succeed or fail. This is because legitimacy is understood to be principally in the
domain of the local. However, as the following discussion will show, this new focus
on the ‘local’ and ‘legitimacy’ does not necessarily escape the problematic
assumptions of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. This is because the role of the
‘local’ is often relegated to procedural considerations rather than substantive ones.
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This is not to dismiss the existence or utility of this paradigm wholesale, but rather, to
question, “what are the politics of invoking hybridity?”75 As Suthaharan Nadarajah
aptly notes, one must “acknowledge hybridity’s potential for resistance and
progressive agendas, but question whether it can be always equated with these.”76
The presence of hegemony and domination does not simplify the complicated
nexus at which the local and the international meet. Instead, it produces a complicated
web of interactions that cannot be distilled to a simplistic binary. Evaluating the
claims of local agency, post-liberal peacebuilding and emancipation in the form of
hybridity requires unpacking these moments of association between the local and the
international, in order to lay bare the politics of hierarchy and resistance within these
interfaces. It is in fact true that “hybridization, rather than liberalization, has been the
dominant trend” in peacebuilding.77 I want to argue that at present, localized forms of
transitional justice do not produce emancipating hybridities for subaltern populations.
This is because it is a hybridization of practice rather than a hybridization of
undergirding assumptions, and also because many aspects of hierarchy are
reproduced in the name of hybridity. This section considers two manifestations of the
hybridization of transitional justice, hybrid tribunals and the revival of customary
practices. This thesis demonstrates that in these hybrid interfaces, the machinations of
hegemony continue to dictate the course of justice. However, this does not hold fast
in all cases, and does not preclude the possibility of ‘everyday agency’ serving as the
foundation for emancipation in the future.
Many discourses carry the banner of hybridity, ranging from the radical and
emancipatory to the moderate and procedural. In practice, transitional justice’s
assumption of hybridity has been primarily of the moderate sort, it emphasizes
hybridity of actors rather than assumptions. Transitional justice is tied to the first
wave of the local turn, not the second. As a result, many of the opportunities for
subaltern agency and emancipation provided by hybridity are lost. In sum, a nonradical vision of hybridity is unlikely to produce radical ends.
Hybridization of transitional justice has particularly taken the form of hybrid
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tribunals, which are considered to be the complementary engagement of international
law and domestic law in order to “provide the necessary resources and guarantees for
a high level of justice in the country where the conflict occurred.”78 Judicial systems
were often in shambles by conflict’s end, and hybrid tribunals were understood to be
a way to reconstruct “law, order, and stability” which were the “essential condictions
for a fair and effective judiciary.”79 Unlike the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), these hybrid tribunals are locally-based. A number of hybrid criminal
tribunals have subsequently proliferated, in Cambodia (1997), Kosovo (2000), TimorLeste (2000), Sierra Leone (2002), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005).80 Criticisms
of liberal peacebuilding have been central to the construction of these apparatuses.
According to Padraig McAuliffe, hybrid tribunals were the result of a dialetic process
“revealed through critique of international tribunals in terms of axes of legitimacy,
capacity building and norm penetration, which were then contrasted with the benefits
of local participation and location in the State where the crimes occurred.”81 Thus, the
model’s potential was understood to be the legitimacy that local participation
conferred onto the justice process.
According to Laura Dickenson, the hybridity of these courts emerges from the
engagement of international apparatuses alongside domestic legal instruments,
resulting in a “blend of the international and the domestic.”82 In hybrid courts, foreign
and domestic judges adjudicate cases litigated by a mix of local and international
legal experts. Thus, the hybridity of these structures is meant to emerge from their
procedures and a variation of actors. However, this troublingly leaves some
underlying assumptions uncontested.
First, supporters of hybrid tribunals envision of the international community
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as inherently ‘objective’ in its interventions in domestic disputes, and uses this idea to
bolster their integration into domestic legal systems. 83 The objectivity of the
international community was meant to be a bulwark against “state complicity, coverup, and other obstructions [of] the very possibility of justice.”84 However, this vision
seriously underestimates the deep politicization of international actors in conflicted
contexts. For one, one must note that the conflicts that are attempting to be reconciled
are not confined to the particular territory in which the violence occurs. Rather,
conflict in the globalized age is international. Jan Selby rightly notes “peace
processes are typically informed by sharply realist power politics.” 85 Roger Mac
Ginty eloquently refers to this paradox as the “Janus-faced nature of hybridity,”
noting that “Canadian troops fired 4.7 million bullets in Afghanistan in a twentymonth period in the mid-2000s, while, at the same time, Afghanistan was Canada’s
largest recipient of international assistance,” with much of that assistance earmarked
for peace processes. 86 Interactions between the international and the local in
conflicted contexts begin long before the moment of reconciliation, which casts
serious doubt on the possibility of international community’s ‘objectivity.’
Second, hierarchy in hybrid tribunals is manifested in certain pedagogical
practices that shape the procedures and outcomes of the trials. As there is the
assumption that “the transitional State… knows neither democracy nor justice,” many
hybrid tribunals are structured in manners that explicitly limit local determination.87
In the hybrid tribunals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to Elizabeth Brunch,
there were institutional differences in the treatment of international judges and staff
and local judges and staff which reinforced the “retaining wall” between the groups.88
These distinctions included the living conditions, travel and pay disparities between
the international and domestic staff. One of the most salient examples Brunch
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provides is the case of language, she notes “the idea that international judges and staff
might use (or learn) the national language(s) was never suggested; English was the
primary language of daily interaction…” 89 While this is par for the course in
international work, Brunch incisively connects it to the impact of hierarchy and status
that operated within the institutional structure. International judges and staff assumed
the role of ‘supra-citizens,’ a class of mobile professionals with social and economic
capital that serve ‘sub-citizens,’ the locally-bound beneficiaries of their work. 90
Brunch argues that these structures of membership created an “ambivalent and
unequal hybridity” that colored the work done by the court, and impacted upon its
decisions.91 This example clearly demonstrates that hybrid institutions have as much
capacity to institutionalize and reinforce existing hierarchies as it has the potential to
dismantle them.
The final challenge is the interpretation and reformulation of law and
knowledge in hegemonic ways. True to the hybrid name, “there is no single or
monolithic model of hybrid tribunals, and all manifestations enjoy a diverse
nomenclature.”92 However, as a matter of practice in hybrid tribunals, “judges apply
domestic law that has been reformed to accord with international standards.”93 This
reformulation of law can have distinct impacts on the decisions themselves, as well as
the legal and ideological reasoning that leads to the decisions. Brunch argues that this
‘reformulation’ is can be tantamount to the “wholesale importation of human rights
law” on the basis of universality. 94 While it is not necessary to outline the longstanding debate on the universality of human rights here, Brunch makes the cogent
case that the uncritical application of human rights law in hybrid tribunals is a
demonstration of hierarchical power relations amongst states. She concludes that the
outcome of this imposition is the “translation of the law of Europe… to the domestic
legal system” and “shifted the balance of power toward international or European
dominance while simultaneously ensuring that Bosnia was always ‘not quite’
89
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Europe.”95 reformulation of knowledge and legalism can reinforce what Dustin Sharp
calls a “subtext of locals as passive recipients of international justice discourse and
practice.”96
Customary practices of justice are at the very core of localized efforts to
forward transitional justice. Cynthia Horne argues that “attention to culturally
resonant and community-driven approaches provides needed balance” to early efforts
that were driven externally, and drew on Western understandings of law and
society.97 By and large, localizing transitional justice has meant a hearty embrace of
customary practices.98 There is an embedded assumption that customary practices and
traditional justice holds the important element of ‘legitimacy.’ Therefore, if local
practices and understandings of justice inform the transitional justice project, the
overall project would be markedly more successful. “Bottom-up” approaches to
transitional justice are the logical extension of this understanding. Horne describes the
three key features of bottom-up programs. First, bottom-up programs “hav[e] the
affected communities themselves generate programs reflecting their ideas for
reconciliation.”99 Second, they “incorporate traditional practices to confer additional
legitimacy on the proceedings.” 100 Finally, “locals implement the programs at a
community level in order to facilitate citizen participation.”101 All of these features
are meant to embed the transitional justice project within the community, such that
the community would embrace the project as germane to their process of healing.
Problematically, this impulse often represents the instrumentalization of
customary practices to forward the overarching goals of transitional justice. Toby S.
Goldbach writes about the distinction between the ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’
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genres of law. For Goldbach, the instrumental genre of law responds to means and
ends, while the expressive genre of law deals with the generation and production of
meaning.102 In relation to the adoption of Indigenous sentencing circles in Canadian
criminal law, Goldbach utilizes the useful language of ‘instrumentalizing the
expressive,’ which means “fashioning constructed expressions of culture into an
instrument for use— may present new and troubling implications for what it means to
employ the law as a tool metaphor.”103 The instrumentalization of custom to the ends
of transitional justice may itself reintroduce the “hegemonic logic of means and
ends,” and risks “destabilizing developments in its effort to deem everything up for
instrumental grabs.” 104 Goldbach utilizes the language of ‘transplantation’ and
‘translation’ to convey the movement between the instrumental and the expressive, in
order to conclude that this moment of conversion presents a “jeopardy for unmet
expectations.”105 This is the first challenge of the instrumentalization of customary
justice.
There are more challenges inherent to the instrumentalization of custom.
Customary practices are intimately tied to their local contexts, meaning that they are
often deeply politicized. Joanna R. Quinn makes the compelling case that the
formalization and codification process of customary mechanisms is by no means
apolitical, but is instead intimately tied to political processes. For example, according
to Quinn, “the government of Uganda has inserted itself into the day-to-day workings
of the traditional cultural institutions themselves.”106
The perceived independence of customary justice from external actors,
commonly understood to be the source of local ‘agency,’ is disputed by Cynthia
Horne. In post-conflict Aceh and Timor-Leste, Horne argues, scholars that laud the
‘bottom-up’ transitional justice mechanisms for their ‘authenticity’ “understate the
role played by extra-regional actors in actually reconstructing and implementing these
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‘traditional’ justice programmes.” 107 Horne writes of a process of ‘reconstitution’
wherein international actors are intimately involved in the overall shape and tenor of
purportedly ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms. Indeed, Horne argues that it was the external
actors that primarily implemented the indigenous practices and their implementation,
ultimately distorting the symbolic meanings associated with the practices.
The decision to incorporate adat, or customary Indonesian reconciliation
practice, into the transitional justice program in Aceh was determined in the design
phase of the project, which occurred in Helskini. The Helsinki process was run almost
to the exclusion of Indonesian representatives, even as the decision was made to
incorporate ‘bottom-up’ transitional justice initiatives.108 Horne cites an Indonesian
negotiator in the process as confirming “the use of adat was driven by the
international community in Aceh and East Timor.”109 Thus, even as the international
community embraced local customary practices with a renewed zeal, the power to
make the decision about the ultimate shape of the transitional justice enterprise was in
Helsinki, not in Aceh. This is not to cast aspersions on the ultimate utility of the
inclusion of adat in Aceh, gacaca in Rwanda, or mato oput in Uganda. The aim, here
is to interrogate where the decision-making power ultimately rests, and to what
specific aims the customary practices are utilized.
This demonstrates a central tension within the localizing turn in transitional
justice. Here, it is the process of transitional justice that is negotiable, and not the
end-point. Even when infused with the express purpose of ‘localizing’ transitional
justice, there are inherent tensions between the universalizing, liberalizing end-goals
of transitional justice and the customary practices which are employed to serve its
ends. Legitimacy is conferred onto the overall transitional justice enterprise through
this fusion, but the assumptions and rationales of transitional justice as a hegemonic
discourse remain intact. Liberal democracy, marketization and the ‘rule of law’ are
non-negotiable outcomes of the transitional justice enterprise. Customary practices of
justice and reconciliation are thus relegated to the subordinate position as instruments
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to the ends of these goals; that is, customary practices serve as the vehicles to secure
these outcomes, rather than outcomes in their own right.

4.4 Hybridity Reexamined
This is not to argue that local agency is completely circumscribed in hybrid
interactions. Indeed, fascinating studies of the ‘everyday’ demonstrate an incredible
subaltern potential for adaption, contestation, cooption and resistance. Even actions
that international actors may consider to be ‘spoiling’ the process can emerge from
this impulse. Richmond and Mitchell argue that partial compliance and cooptation
can be an act of local authorship, it can emerge as “a means for reforming the norms
and institutions that were in effect imposed on them.”110 This is illustrative of the
vision of hybridity informed by postcolonialism. Rather than viewing the relationship
of hegemony as one of complete determinism, scholars such as Homi Bhabha have
articulated that at the meeting of different constituencies a ‘Third Space’ is borne,
which is a site of subversion and a “renegotiation of cultures and identity, and
multiple positionality.” 111 For Bhabha, the hybrid holds a valorized position of
ultimate resistance against hegemonic power. According to Amar Acheraïou, Bhabha
understood hybridity to be the “fundamental tool by which the colonized resisted and
subverted the colonizer’s cultural, political and ideological domination.”112 Agency,
here, lies in the ability to upend hegemonic order through subversion, resistance and
negotiation.
However, it is important not to lose sight of hierarchy in the search for local
agency. It is true that hybridity can serve as an opportunity for local and even
subaltern populations to demonstrate incredible dynamism. However, Nadarajah and
Rampton argue that a consequence of “locating in ‘hidden’ local agency both
resistance to liberal peace and the possibility of ‘alternative’ hybrid forms of
peace/building is the neglect of economic and social structures” as well as an
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understanding of “how the international weighs heavily on the local.”113 Customary
practices of justice are not exempt from this calculus. Where customary peacemaking
and justice practices are “permitted by the liberal peace,” they always occur “in a
meta-environment shaped by liberal peace norms and institutions….” 114 For Mac
Ginty, this means that one can envision indigenous peace and reconciliation
initiatives as occurring at the behest of a “paradigm established elsewhere.”115 Often,
the impulse for local ownership, integration and agency therefore acts as an
amendment to the transitional justice toolkit, rather than a wholesale revision of its
contents.
Hybrid transitional justice does not escape the logic of the liberal peace. For
all the literature that declares the death knell of liberal peacebuilding, reality suggests
that the underlying project remains very much intact. This is because the liberal peace
forms the skeleton onto which the peacebuilding project is grafted: it provides the
ideological, political, and practical means by which peacebuilding is conceptualized
and implemented. It has been so thoroughly ingrained in humanitarian, development
and justice works that even discourse at the margins of these fields are colored by its
influence. For Richmond and Mitchell, “the liberal register in which peacebuilding
occurs made it extremely difficult to conduct unscripted conversations with local
communities or elites.”116 In essence, hybrid forms of justice in the current mode can
serve as mere vectors for the production of legitimacy, to complete for the overriding
project of human rights, democratization and marketization. In hybrid transitional
justice, the liberal peace assumes a new and more ‘legitimate’ shape.
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Chapter 5

5

Constructing the Victim, Settling Accounts

Transitional justice prides itself on being ‘victim-centered’ as a field, with an
emphasis on victims’ desires, needs and dignity post-conflict. Transitional justice
processes are frequently accompanied by a call to “ask the victims what they want,”
which “reinforces the notion that victims should occupy a central role in determining
responses to harm.”

1

But before questions of culpability, accountability and

reconciliation can have salience in transitional justice, the categories of ‘victim’ and
‘perpetrator’ must be constructed and codified. However, the realities of mass atrocity
and conflict rarely comport with these sanitized categories. The particular manner of
the construction of these categories, and their use in the social project of transitional
justice requires further scrutiny. This chapter has three main purposes. First, it
considers and complicates the particular construction of the victim in transitional
justice and its usage. Second, it considers the ways that the search for justice in the
name of victims can result in the instrumentalization of victim’s narratives and
victims themselves. Finally, it finds that the practice of ‘settling accounts’ in truth
commissions can have the effect of neutralizing contesting narratives of victimhood.

5.1 Constructions of Victimhood in Transitional Justice
As Annalise Acorn writes, “we do not feel pity for those who bring about their own
demise.”2 Ultimately, the determination of those victim narratives that are deemed
worthy of compassion is intimately tied to perceptions of agency. For those to whom
one extends their compassion, blots of character and difficult decisions are often
smoothed out with the assurance of determinism. On the other hand, narratives that
are deemed unworthy of compassion are suffused with agency. Bronwyn Leebaw
outlines Hannah Arendt’s distinction between ‘temptation’ and ‘coercion,’ with
ultimately different culpabilities. “Arendt insisted that, ‘if someone points a gun at
1
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you and says, ‘Kill your friend or I will kill you,’ he is tempting you, that is all.’”3
When it comes to perpetrators, the question of agency is tied up in considerations of
their ultimate culpability in atrocities. Consider, for example, the long-standing
deliberations about the ultimate culpability of ‘big fish,’ the leaders of organizations
charged with atrocities and the ‘small fry,’ those at the bottom of the totem pole that
executed orders from those above them. However, as this section demonstrates, the
same logic of agency and culpability is used to determine the veracity of victim
narratives, and the victimhood of victims themselves. The construction of victims in
transitional justice is problematic in three main ways: first, it defines victims
reductively in opposition to perpetrators; second, it demands ‘innocence’ from
victims in order to claim the mantle of victimhood; and finally, it excludes the
possibility of actors that do not fit comfortably on any side of this dichotomy.
Transitional justice literature often relies on a construction of victims and
perpetrators as existing on a diametrically opposed binary. As Tristan Anne Borer
notes, there is an implicit assumption here that the groups are homogenous, “victims
and perpetrators are referred to as if they are all the same. The victims and The
perpetrators.”4 The interrelations between these groups are similarly scripted. Govier
and Voerword outline this dichotomy as follows: “One person acts; the other is acted
upon. One harms; the other is harmed. One is evil; the other is good. One bears
responsibility; the other none.” 5 Clearly this dichotomy is reductive, as it shrinks
complex interrelations in situations of extreme stress to a morality play between the
forces of good and evil. There is an important parallel here to the construction of
victims of ‘ordinary crimes,’ or those crimes that are not understood to rise to the
level of mass atrocity. Alleta Brenner considers the victim-perpetrator binary in the
case of rape. Brenner argues that the victim-perpetrator binary is “simultaneously
fixed and relational.”6 This means that the crime itself, and its mutually constitutive
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categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ are all intricately tied to one another. Here,
victims are primarily constituted through their experience of harm from perpetrators.
Thus, there can be no crime without a perpetrator and victim, and no victim without a
distinct perpetrator. This reductive approach to conflict belies the fact that reality can
have multiple, contradictory elements.
One must also consider the sorts of harm that can be accounted for by this
victim-perpetrator nexus. As this dichotomy relies on a perpetrator to act against a
victim, this greatly reduces the scope of possible harm to that which can be
understood on an interpersonal level. Here, in order to claim the mantle of
victimhood, one must have been harmed by an individual perpetrator in a tangible,
knowable way. 7 This is a result of the fact that harms in transitional justice are
conceptualized as violations of human rights, which are individual in nature. Human
rights theory presumes that individuals constitute the reserve of rights-holders, as
rights are a “justified claim on someone for something that is owed.”8 This limits the
scope of the human rights enterprise to those that can be articulated within the liberal,
individual framework. The consequence is that may lose the opportunity to redress
systemic-level harms, which are often diffuse and imprecise in nature, and unsuitable
to be conceptualized through a victim-perpetrator dichotomy.9
This victim-perpetrator dichotomy also constructs a particular vision of an
idealized ‘victim,’ which can become a litmus test to claim the mantle of victimhood.
Susan Hirsch uses the provocative language of the ‘victim deserving of global justice’
to illustrate this point. Particularly after the ratification of the Rome Statute which
explicitly centers the figure of the victim, Hirsch presciently reminds readers that “the
establishment and early development of new global institutions is intertwined with
the constitution of new global subjects.” 10 To explain this point, Ben Golder
illustrates the Foucauldian vision of the ‘ambivalence of rights,’ which means that
“position of rights- claimant or rights-holder is simultaneously our entry into regimes
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of power- knowledge which bind us to particular truths, ways of thinking and acting
and being.”11 This means that at the moment that one claims a right and the privileges
associated by that right, one becomes a subject produced by the definitional constricts
of that right. Here, the victim becomes a ‘victim-subject,’ or “one who conforms to
institutional requirements” of victimhood.12
Innocence is an important aspect of the construction of victimhood in
transitional justice. For victims to be ‘true’ victims, transitional justice requires a
form of blamelessness that can be contrasted against the perpetrator from which one
demands accountability. This is especially true in terms of claims-making, where the
figure of the child is often invoked as the ultimate symbol of innocence. 13 It is
important to note how the designation of innocence and guiltlessness can be a process
that is more illustrative of societal structures than the actual veracity of a victim’s
claims. Brenner makes the point that the trope of the innocent victim in cases of rape
severely circumscribed the manner in which their claims were handled. According to
Brenner, “Within this framework, which has endured into the present day, only
women who were sexually pure and thus chaste were capable of being raped. Once
she had "fallen," it was assumed that a woman was always ready, and looking, for
sex.” 14 The designation of victimhood, here, is only available to those who are
deemed to ‘deserve’ that status. In the presence of gendered, racialized, and otherwise
hegemonic structures, the designation of victimhood can be filtered through the lens
of these societal understandings. Thus, the particular manner in which innocence is
constructed and interpreted can be a useful indicator of hierarchies and hegemonies
within societies and the international system.
In transitional justice, the trope of the innocent victim takes on a distinctly
political character. As Luke Moffett notes, the trope of the innocent victim is “often
used to deny victimhood to those who suffered due to their background or conduct, or
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to legitimize violence against individuals or groups.”15 Laplante and Theidon outline
exactly this process in the case of Peru. In Peru, “to be a victim today, one must claim
innocence.”16 In the aftermath of Peru’s civil war between the state armed forces and
the two rebel groups Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Movimiento Revolucionario
Tupac Amaru (MRTA), ‘claiming innocence’ has a distinct political meaning. Those
who supported ‘subversives’ were understood to have lost their innocence in the
process of defying the state, with distinct consequences. According to Laplante and
Theirdon, “national reparations plan specifically exclude members of subversive
groups, whether or not victimized in the same war.” 17 The determination of
‘innocence’ in contexts of political conflict, then, can take on distinctly political
appearances. The trope of the innocent victim, according to Erin K. Baines, reduces
the agency of people in conflicted context to “navigate in order to survive.”18 Baines
argues that people “contest, resist, and protest gross violations of their person.” 19
However, those who resist the harms they experience can be denied the title of victim,
simply the constructed image of ‘true’ victimhood is depoliticized. This construction
of victimhood legitimizes the narratives of some victims, while leaving others
troublingly excluded from the fold.
The construction of victimhood in transitional justice is often conceived as the
direct opposite to the construction of the perpetrator. The dichotomy between victims
and perpetrators assumes that people navigating complex conflict scenarios can be
neatly categorized in terms of their culpability and experiences of harm. However, as
Govier and Verwoerd argue, “the dichotomy between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ is
neither exclusive nor exhaustive.”20 This binary framework is a poor representation of
the lived experiences of people in conflict scenarios, as it excludes two possibilities:
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the possibility of actors that exist as neither victims nor perpetrators, and the
possibility of a single actor embodying both characteristics at different times. People
navigate the spaces of criminality and victimhood in dynamic ways; they can be
victims and perpetrators at the same instance, and even in the same interaction. As
McEvoy and McConnachie argue, these changes can occur “depending on a whole
range of variables—these are not static categories.” 21 The presumption of static
categories allows transitional justice literature to speak of victims and perpetrators as
concrete concepts, articulating a vision of victim’s needs and perpetrator culpability
in coherent ways. When mapped onto instances of conflict, however, these concepts
begin to lose some of their salience. Child soldiers have become paradigmatic cases
of the contradictory constructions of “newly emergent subject forms” such as the
victim and perpetrator. 22 Julie Bernath considers the cases of ‘complex political
victims’ in Cambodia, who are “victims who simultaneously or successively
experienced harm and participated in systems of oppression and political violence.”23
Bernath makes the trenchant observation that the simplicity of the image of the victim
in political violence “constitutes the first step in producing the political space for
mass victimization,” as it “contributes to problematic differentiations between
good/bad and us/them.” 24 The harms experienced by complex political victims
complicates the search for reconciliation and peacebuilding, which often invokes the
image of the victim and envisions these practices as victim-centered.

5.2 Invoking the Victim
The image of the victim is a potent clarion call for action, and it has been utilized as a
rhetorical device in numerous transitional contexts to advocate for specific
transitional justice processes. Susan Hirsch considers the debate on the
implementation of Mato Oput in Uganda, and particularly clarifies that both sides of
the debate argued on the basis of victims’ needs and interests. Hirsch writes that the
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features of the practice were represented in polar opposite ways depending on the
outlook of the discussants, “as if reflected in a series of fun-house mirrors that
exaggerated its purported positive or negative qualities.” 25 On one hand, there are
those who characterize the processes as “well-respected responses to conflict dating
from ‘time immemorial’ and with strong roots in Acholi culture.”
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characterize the practices as recent constructions of tradition, “long severed from
Acholi cultural practice—that were being forced onto a population by leaders with
questionable motives.” 27 The important element, here, is that both sides used the
image of the victim to buttress their arguments, evaluating the use of ‘international’
or ‘local’ justice mechanisms by their impact on victims. This is indicative of the
‘victim-centered approach’ to transitional justice, but it is also illustrative of how the
image of the victim can become a rhetorical device used to forward the aims of a
particular project or paradigm. Here, it is the “a general appeal to the cultural salience
to victims” that is important to consider.28
The seemingly simple task of ‘asking victims what they want’ is belied by
myriad conceptual and pragmatic challenges.29 As discussed above, the designation of
victimhood is not a straightforward process, and it is sometimes a difficult prospect to
know exactly who ‘ask.’ Hirsch brilliantly outlines the ways in which the production
of knowledge about victim’s wants and needs can be colored by the agendas and
vantage points of the inquirer. Here, “‘For whom is the pollster working?’ becomes
an important question that disavowals of political manipulation may not easily
satisfy.”30 For this to be true, one does not necessarily have to ascribe a malicious
intent to the organizations that produce and disseminate this knowledge. Rather, these
“partisan attempts to illuminate victim’s interests” are the result of the application of
pre-existing frameworks of knowledge to the conflicted contexts.31 As Hirsch argues,
“representatives from human rights organizations were long involved in assessing the
extent of the violence in the northern Uganda conflict and advocating for redress
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through recognizable human rights processes.”32 The fact that these organizations that
produced knowledge on victims would interpret and articulate what they saw in the
language of human rights violations and redress is unsurprising. However, it is
important to consider how the framing of ‘victim’s interests’ in this manner can
distort the narratives and experiences of victims.
The invocation of victim’s interests can be an exercise in instrumentalization.
Transitional justice translates the powerful narrative of victim harms into normative
prescriptions for social reshaping. According to Kieran McEvoy, victims’ stories can
be invoked “in the pursuit of larger political and social goals such as reinforcing the
rule of law, deterring future offenders, getting to the ‘truth’ of past violence and, of
course, the pragmatic deal-making that is inherent in making peace.”33 This can have
serious psychological impacts on the victims, whose narratives can be key “means to
achieve a successful prosecution.”34 In retributive justice mechanisms, victims can be
subjected to the troubles of an adversarial justice process, significant delays in the
meting out of justice, and unrealistic expectations of the outcomes of the justice
processes.35 All of this can be expected of the victim with the assumption that this
will assist in the process of personal recovery, but mostly in the hopes that it will
support societal recovery. However, as the following section shows, this
instrumentalization is not exclusive to the retributive paradigm, it also features
prominently in the primary mechanism of restorative justice: truth commissions.

5.3 Settling Truth
For Ruti Teitel, truth commissions represent “impunity’s antidote and amnesty’s
analogue,” a fight against disappearance of crimes, and the reformulation of
collective memory.36 The reach of truth commissions across the globe is breathtaking,
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extending from Argentina, Canada, Chad, Guatemala, Haiti, South Africa, and
Uganda, amongst others. The claim of the truth commission is a simple one: it is an
attempt to ‘settle the account’ of collective memory so that the harms experienced by
victims can be made material, and so that the victims of those crimes are not lost to
history. As Teitel argues, “the disappearance of the citizen displays a perversely cruel
and absolute sovereignty.” 37 The truth commission, then, attempts to restore the
dignity lost by those victims, assuring that their injustices would not go unmarked.
Chrisje Brants and Katrien Klep succinctly describe the relationship between
transitional justice and memory this way:
Transitional justice… (re)produces memories but aspires to more than that.
“Justice” requires that the different theatres of memory are collected into one
“truth” (Osiel’s “coherent collective memory,” Minow’s “national
narrative”). This means that transitional justice can be understood as a
mediator between different collec- tive memories. Moreover, unlike film,
this mediator embodies the voice of (legal) authority. The version of past
events that courts and truth commissions produce in their verdicts and
reports is an authoritative claim of truth.38
Truth commissions translate victim narratives into an authoritative account of
history, they attempt to ‘settle the account’ of the past by introducing a ‘truth’ that is
tangible, provable and appreciable. This is an incredibly important process, as it
renders victim accounts impervious to denial, forgetting and relativization. 39 Thus,
“truth commissions are at once socially embedded and transformative,” they are
socially embedded as they draw from testimony to substantiate accounts, and
transformative as they actively participate in the construction of social memory. 40
However, the production of an authoritative truth can become challenging when faced
with the complex reality of conflict-affected contexts, where contested narratives of
harm and victimhood are common.
Truth commissions are caught between competing aims, as they are
simultaneously rooted in the immediate context of conflict and aspiring to move
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beyond those very cleavages. 41 Although truth commissions regularly make truth
claims about their findings, the reality is that the truth-seeking process requires an
active, normative interpretation of the past.42 Molly Andrews draws out this dynamic
this way, “we have a responsibility to remember, ‘to keep memory alive, not to
forget’… But never forget what? Keep which memory alive?” 43 Ultimately, the
production of collective memory in truth commissions involves the rendering of a
verdict. It requires adjudicating “between contending positions by confirming or
rejecting certain narratives and explanations that hold sway in public debates.”44 The
process of combing through and divining ‘truth’ from these competing claims can
have a marked impact on the collective memory of the past, as well as on the victims
whose narratives are appraised, evaluated, and decided upon.
Although contested narratives continue to exist, the elevation of specific
narratives to the authority of ‘truth’ carries problematic assumptions. Of course, there
is the epistemological assumption that truth can be divined through a particular
political process. But there is also a deeper ontological understanding about the nature
and apprehension of ‘truth’ itself. While the particular mode of capturing truth is
dialectic, there remains a “positivist assumption that a single truth is possible and
identifiable,” which can complicate the reality that “multiple and contradictory truths
may exist within a single interaction.”45 If this is true, then the particular ‘truths’ that
are raised to the mantle of ‘truth’ can be illustrative of the pitfalls of social structures
in transitional contexts.
The image of the ‘ideal victim’ has social, as well as political implications.
Hegemonies of identity, social class and cleavage and gender can find their way into
the authoritative account of the ‘truth’ established by truth commissions. The
language of ‘hearing’ and ‘voicing’ narratives of truth can obscure the politics of
erasure and silence that works behind the scenes. “People do not enter the public
forum as equals,” and therefore “the stories of some people made it… more easily
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into ‘history’ than those of others.”46 Elizabeth Jelin makes this case incredibly well
in reference to the Nunca Más report that formed the basis for the determination of an
authoritative truth in Argentina following the Dirty Wars. Here, ‘multiple
marginalities,’ on the basis of class, ethnicity and region formed the official account
of what happened in the Ledesma blackout (Apagón de Ledesma) in which hundreds
were detained, and dozens forcibly disappeared. Here, “a master narrative of the
Ledesma case developed in the national human rights community.”47 To be sure, this
master narrative is informed by other narratives, but it also actively shapes the other
narratives.
The case of the date of the Ledesma blackout is instructive. According to the
Nunca Más report, the Ledesma blackout occurred in July 27th, 1976. And yet, those
that lived through the brutalization contest that it did not occur on July 27th, but
instead on July 20th. As Jelin accounts, “Why commemorate on July 27, then?
Clearly, because it is in the book.” 48 Jelin recounts relatives of the disappeared
arguing that “they can put today, yesterday or tomorrow; you can go and change
dates, but those of us who lived through it know. It was July 20, July 20, 1976.”49
And yet, public commemorations of the Ledesma blackout occur, without fail, on
July 27th. This has served to alienate the very victims that it was meant to honor.
According to Jelin, “they did not participate in an event that they felt was not
theirs.” 50 This minute but incredibly meaningful example illustrates the manner in
which those in authority can settle contested narratives of truth. However, the settling
of these accounts does not diffuse contested truths, instead, the permeation of existing
hegemonies can produce tension and silence. As Jelin explains,
This is a story of class, region, and race. The events referred to seem rather
minor. They are not registered by the media, by public opinion, or by state
agencies. Nobody talks about them. Nobody interprets the microdynamics of
the case in terms of class, ethnic, or racial cleavages. That is part of the
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cultural silences of Argentina. Yet it is clear that in the (mostly muted)
conflicts about the memories of the past, there are deeper social cleavages,
which anteceded the specific events referred to. The emergence of the stories
of the “others,” however, may only be circumstantial, unless there are deeper
changes in the structures of power, locally and nationally.51
The political aspect of the ‘ideal victim’ and the production of silence is
salient here. In the Argentinian case outlined by Jelin, the isolated region of Jujuy was
considered to be ‘subversive,’ which impacted significantly on the reception of their
accounts of victimhood.52 However, the vision of history and politics forwarded by
truth commissions depoliticizes the conflict and violence that makes them necessary.
According to Greg Grandin, truth commissions historicize the past as a background
against which the present can be contrasted, rather than viewing the structural
conditions that contributed to conflict. Truth commissions can use avoidance of
contentious topics in an attempt to diffuse and transform conflicted political
landscapes. 53 However, as Bronwyn Leebaw argues, “depoliticization does not
transcend the politics of transitional justice, but rather functions to obfuscate and
naturalize the way that politics operate in the process of judging the past.” 54 As
Grandin argues, “by presenting an interpretation of history as parable rather than as
politics, largely denied the conditions that brought them into being.”55 Paradoxically,
it seems, in the name of memory, truth commissions can institutionalize a particular
form of forgetting.
This form of forgetting has particular social ramifications when considered in
light of the social project that transitional justice attempts to foster. According to
Grandin, the historicity that is often reproduced in truth commissions mirrors
“nationalism’s enabling paradox,” which is “the need to forget acts of violence
central to state formation that can never be forgotten.”56 It is telling, then, that the

51

Ibid., 205.
Ibid., 203.
53
Onur Bakiner, “One Truth Among Others?” 346. Bronwyn Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored
Violence, 15.
54
Bronwyn Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, 15.
55
Greg Grandin, “The Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National History, and
State Formation in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala,” The American Historical Review 110, no. 1
(2005), 48.
56
Ibid.
52

80
specific historical and political elements of the conflicts that germinated the truth
commissions that proliferated in Latin America were depoliticized. Terror was not
read “as an essential element in the consolidation of a new neoliberal order,” or “as an
extension of a reactive campaign against social-democratic nationalist projects,” but
instead “as a breakdown of social relations as but one more instance in a repetitive
cycle of ‘interruptions in democratic rule.’” 57 This limits the transformative and
radical potential of truth-telling. The individual experiences of repression may here be
captured, but the core interpretation of historical and political forces leaves something
to be wanting. According to Leebaw, this naturalizes “the compromises, distortions
and asymmetries that frame their investigations,” and this in turn forecloses “ongoing
debate regarding the terms of official memory in the process of political change.”58
This serves as the moment of the construction of political truth that is meant to be the
basis of the state and society going forward.
Forgiveness, reconciliation and compassion are the cornerstones of restorative
justice. According to the restorative justice argument, a realignment of social
relations between the perpetrator and victim social change can begin. Of course, this
understanding is wrought with the challenges of a fixed conception of ‘victim’ and
‘perpetrator,’ but this must be left aside for the moment. The requirement for
forgiveness clearly demands a significant contribution from the victim. Annalise
Acorn argues that victims can be ‘compelled to compassion’ through this mandate.
As Annalise Acorn asks, “how can a system of justice be structured around a general
demand for such supererogatory patience and devotion from victims?”59 If the healing
begins with the victims, it seems, there is an incentive for victim participation. But
one can imagine contexts in which this is not the case. According to Acorn, “The
significance of forgiveness to restorative justice lies in its possible contribution to the
ultimate restorative goal of right-relation - that is, a lived relationship of mutual
equality and respect.” 60 Note that this is not, itself, a victim-centered reality.
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Therefore, Acorn argues, “if forgiveness is a necessary element of restorative justice,
it is only instrumentally so.”61
This does not mean that the function of or reason for forgiveness is never an
agential decision on the victim’s behalf. However, it means that sometimes, the
function of forgiveness, and a significant reason for its consistent invocation, is that it
forwards the social project of transitional justice. The victim’s forgiveness, here, is an
instrument in the wide-reaching social project of transitional justice. Consider, as
well, the role that victims are meant to play in the process of reconciliation. The role
is dualistic; it is intended to be a path of personal, as well as social recovery. The
victim-witness bears a responsibility to herself, as well as to the social project of
which her testimony is a part. However, there are tensions involved in the process that
lead to the possibility of these two roles of the victim can come in conflict with one
another. Thus, it is true that ‘the victim’ is a central figure in transitional justice,
mooring the literature and practice in its normative and pragmatic understanding.
However, the victim-centered approach in transitional justice is fraught with
challenges.
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Chapter 6

6

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, I have outlined the ways in which the current state of
transitional justice is entangled with, and often indebted to, the presence and
workings of hegemony. I argued that this reality can frustrate the emancipatory aims
of transitional justice. This concluding chapter begins by summarizing the critiques
this thesis has forwarded thus far, and considering the implications that these
criticisms have on current transitional justice theory and practice. This thesis ends on
a note of meditation, as I consider the prospects of a transitional justice that discards
these problematic assumptions and associations and reworks itself to confront
hegemonic forces rather than bolstering them.

6.1 Summary of Arguments
The first chapter of this thesis, “Locating Transitional Justice in Historical
Perspective,” evaluated the orthodox narrative of the emergence of transitional justice
onto the international stage. The transitional justice origin story tells of an emergence
onto the world stage in fits and starts, culminating in an eventual normative
acceptance of transitional justice principles at a global level. The orthodox
transitional justice history proceeds as follows: beginning with the auspicious
opportunities presented by the end of the Second World War, transitional justice was
temporarily hampered by the onset of the Cold War and the political distortions
wrought by the bipolar world system. At the end of the Cold War, this narrative goes,
a normative shift in the international system allowed for the procession of a ‘justice
cascade,’ which itself became the centerpiece of a move towards transitional justice.
However, this thesis argued that this transitional justice origin story relied on an
active re-interpretation of the motives and actions of states and policymakers at
seminal moments in each of these shifts. To demonstrate the revisionism inherent to
the transitional justice origin story, this chapter considered the case of the Nuremberg
trials, which many transitional justice scholars consider to be a pivotal moment in
transitional justice history.
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The Nuremberg trials, according to transitional justice scholars, were a
symbolic moment of change in the post-WWII era. For transitional justice literature,
the ‘Nuremberg legacy’ came to mean the first real challenge to the inviolability of
state sovereignty. For transitional justice scholars, Nuremberg came to signify the
moment when the jurisdiction of the state could no longer be utilized as a justification
for the wanton deprivation of human rights for citizens. Contrary to this revisionist
reading, however, the Nuremberg trials can be seen to buttress the authority of state
sovereignty, as it was through the active invocation of the principle of sovereignty
that the Allied powers justified their jurisdiction over the proceedings. This thesis
argued that the repeated misreading of the substance and significance of the
Nuremberg trials served a legitimizing function for transitional justice literature. This
reading anchors the field in the moment of the creation of the modern state system,
which grants transitional justice field a precedence and validity that it otherwise
might not have had.
The significance of this argument is twofold. First, it casts doubt on the
orthodox narrative of transitional justice. But more crucially, it allows for a
reorientation of emergence of transitional justice discourse in the twentieth century.
Unmooring the rise of transitional justice from its dubious situation in the post-WWII
era allows one to place it in the moment where the term ‘transitional justice,’ along
with its normative aims and pragmatic goals actually came to fruition: the post-Cold
War era. This, in turn, permits the analysis of transitional justice discourse in relation
to an entirely different international arena, and places transitional justice discourse in
dialogue with the geopolitical and ideational changes that were occurring at this
precise moment. Thus, transitional justice can be considered in line with the ‘third
wave of liberalization,’ the emergence of the United States as the world’s remaining
superpower, and the ideological triumph of liberalism in the world system. In the
proceeding chapters, it allows for transitional justice literature to be considered in
concert with democratization, liberal peacebuilding, and the legacy of modernization
theory.
“Transitional Justice: Fashioning the Liberal Democratic Polity?” is the
second chapter of this thesis. This chapter considers the embedded end-goal of liberal
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democracy in transitional justice literature, the problematic assumptions that
undergird this end, and the implications of this democratic objective on the
transitional justice project. The democratic peace thesis is central to understandings of
the value and necessity of democracy in transitional justice. The democratic peace
thesis argues that, as a general trend, democratic states in the international system do
not go to war with one another. Transitional justice scholars use this thesis to argue
that democratic states are, by nature, peaceful. As ‘transitional’ states are often
wracked by war and social conflict, the lack of democracy is diagnosed as a principle
problem for transitional states. Setting aside the contested validity of the democratic
peace thesis itself, this argument stretches the democratic peace thesis to its
conceptual breaking point. The democratic peace thesis makes no argument about the
likelihood of democratic states to experience intrastate conflict, which is the sort of
conflict that ‘transitional’ states are most likely to face. As well, the transitional
justice assumption of the democratic peace thesis raises troubling concerns about the
nature of power and hegemony in transitional justice prescriptions. It aligns
transitional justice with the hegemonic aims of American foreign policy.
The democracy promotion impulse embedded in transitional justice shares
troubling resonances with the assumption and proliferation of modernization theory in
the Cold War era. This is combined with the particular features of the moment of
transitional justice’s emergence onto the world stage: unipolar American hegemony,
the ideological triumph of liberal internationalism in the world system, and the
proliferation of liberal peacebuilding theory and practice. Together, this indicates that
transitional justice practice does the grunt work of laying a foundation for the creation
and maintenance of liberal spaces across the world. This means the construction of
liberal institutions from on high, in such a manner as to exclude all other possibilities
of state formation and the concurrent construction of liberal subjects from below,
those that are meant to populate these liberal states. Together, global governance of
state-building, liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice can be seen to close this
gap. This thesis demonstrated that the democratic peace thesis creates a security
dilemma whereby all non-liberal democratic state formations and populations are
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considered a threat to the ‘zone of peace.’ Transitional justice, this thesis argues, may
be the technocratic solution to this security dilemma.
The guiding question of this chapter is “who is transitional justice meant to
serve?” If the scholars of transitional justice and the proponents of the democratic
peace thesis are meant to be believed, the democratization of ‘transitional’ states will
lessen past social conflict, meaningfully engage the populace in the present and allow
for the inclusion in the international community in the future. However, these hopes
are pinned on a rationale for democratization that, at its core, is about the preservation
of order in the international system and not the society in question. In the face of the
script of marketization and democratization, alternative forms of governance are
effectively excluded from the outset. This discord is made particularly troubling when
understood in the context of a radical program of social engineering where liberal
democracy is the pre-ordained outcome.
The third chapter, “Hybridity to the Rescue?” considers transitional justice in
relation to current peacebuilding practice. It begins by outlining the rise and crisis of
liberal peacebuilding in the international arena. Liberal peacebuilding attempts to
realizes the hopes and promises of the liberal peace. Similar to the democratic peace,
the liberal peace is constituted by an ideological and political commitment to
marketization and democratization. In the immediate post-Cold War era, the hope of
the liberal peace extending to all corners of the globe encouraged the enlargement of
international organizations and their deeper penetration into matters of conflict.
Transitional justice, as a discipline, is an integral element of the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm. It emerged on the coattails of this changing wind in the international
system, and the goals of ushering in the ‘rule of law’ were understood to be central to
the attainment of the liberal peace.
The material and ideological elements of liberal peacebuilding were quickly
called into question, as the liberal peacebuilding paradigm was frustrated by
intractable conflict, peacebuilding failures and challenges to the interventionist
posture of international organizations. For liberal peacebuilding, and for transitional
justice in particular, the solution was understood to be a turn to the ‘local.’ I argue
that the turn towards the local was affected by two problems: the problem of knowing
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the local and the problem of local knowledge. The problem of knowing the local is
the essentialized portrait of the ‘local’ that emerges from the instrumentalist approach
that peacebuilding and transitional justice scholars used in relation to ‘transitional’
societies. Here, a binary opposition is drawn between the ‘local’ and the
‘international,’ with problematic results. This leads to the problem of local
knowledge, which is the process by which an artificial script and understanding of the
‘local’ is produced that can be translated into the language of technocratic solutions.
From this grounding, I then analyze the ways that these problematic
assumptions can impact the interfaces at which the ‘local’ and the ‘international’
interact. Hybrid tribunals and the incorporation of customary justice mechanisms, two
manners in which transitional justice has attempted to incorporate the local into
transitional justice, are considered from this perspective. Ultimately, I argue that
hybrid attempts at transitional justice fails to escape the logic of the liberal peace.
This is because the rethinking of approaches with local communities has largely been
in the procedural realm, and does not reach the theoretical assumptions that undergird
the field. As a result, many attempts at ‘local ownership,’ can be read as attempts to
generate legitimacy for the overarching social project of transitional justice.
The final chapter of this thesis is “Constructing the Victim, Settling
Accounts.” It follows from the earlier discussion of agency and constraint in
transitional justice, as experienced through hybrid interfaces between the ‘local’ and
‘international’. As new global institutions are created, new subjects must also be
created to populate those institutions. The victim in transitional justice is one example
of a new subject on the global stage. This chapter considers the construction of
victimhood in transitional justice, the invocation of the victim in transitional justice
and the neutralization of contesting narratives of victimhood through transitional
justice mechanisms. The neatly categorized binaries between victim and perpetrator
in transitional justice require deconstruction. The idealized image of the victim in
transitional justice is of a ‘blameless victim,’ which can have the effect of
depoliticizing the manner in which individuals navigate conflicted landscapes. The
image of the victim is invoked in transitional justice in order to forward policy
proposals, even as the impulse to ‘ask the victims what they want,’ is mediated
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through a liberal filter. Thus, needs and wants of the victims of a conflict can be
distorted for distinctly political ends, even if that is not the intended effect of the
inquirer.
Contested narratives of victimhood are settled through the process of
‘reconciling the past,’ particularly through the transitional justice mechanism of truth
commissions. Truth commissions aim to ‘settle the truth,’ and to come to a resolution
regarding the injustices of the past. This is significant because truth commissions are
meant to serve a dual purpose, they are meant to remedy personal injury as well as
provide a basis for nation-building. In effect, however, through authoritative appeals
to the Truth, truth commissions can cement in place the same unjust political
dynamics that propagated the conflict that made them necessary.

6.2

Imagining Transitional Justice Anew

The rule of law, accountability, reconciliation and justice constitute the cornerstone of
the transitional justice enterprise. These are all ‘essentially contested concepts,’
meaning that their utility, application and implementation are ceaselessly under
negotiation. 1 At the very moment of its utterance, the invocation of a contested
concept inspires dialogues that comb through meanings and create meanings anew.
And yet, the particular manner in which transitional has reconciled the contested
landscape that it navigates seems to have been to ignore these paradigmatic debates
altogether. Transitional justice has constructed a literature and practice, complete with
a toolkit, atop a single answer to the questions inspired by these concepts. As I have
argued throughout this thesis, there are many problems with the liberal register in
which transitional justice occurs. But these problems emanate from the initial effort to
close down paradigmatic discussions about these essentially contested concepts
through technocratic language and appeals to pragmatism.
Homogeneity, which is the intended outcome of the liberal peace, cannot be
the guidepost for transitional justice. As Derrida notes, there is a “necessary iterability
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of justice,” which is “foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotrophic.” 2
Contested concepts provide a universe of possibilities to select, reject and renew.
Stymying this essential process of negotiation inherent to contested concepts has
grave consequences for the field. The process of coming to a single answer in
response to the infinite potentiality offered by contested concepts forces transitional
justice to assume a hegemonic posture. This can “close our understandings of
justice,” to those that meet certain pre-defined criteria.3 It can also allow the politics
of hegemony, coercion and domination to work through the transitional justice
process unchecked. In denying the contestations inherent to justice seeking, indeed,
those very contestations that generate justice, transitional justice forecloses the
critique of hegemonic forces that should guide its pursuit. With the definitions of
‘justice’ preset, the end-goal of the liberal democratic peace programmed-in, and an
instrumentalist approach to victims and the ‘local’ to achieve these determined goals,
transitional justice loses its most indispensable asset: its potential for emancipation.
This is a disappointment. Transitional justice is a promising endeavor. It seeks
reconciliation

after

conflict,

justice in

the face of mass

atrocity,

and

acknowledgement for victims in a sphere which silences and marginalizes them.
These goals are laudable, essential, and liberatory. But, my research implies, the
manner in which these concepts have been treated precludes their realization. An
alternative vision of transitional justice is not only possible, but necessary. Promising
strides have been recently made be some scholars in the realm of peacebuilding,
which transitional justice could certainly incorporate into the field. The second wave
of the local turn in peacebuilding emphasizes everyday agency, resistance to
hegemony and the power of subaltern populations in order to mount a devastating
critique of liberal peacebuilding. 4 This critique reorients peacebuilding scholarship

Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil
Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 250.
3
David Hoogenboom, “Theorizing ‘Transitional Justice’” (PhD diss. Western University, 2014).
4
See Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, “Towards a PostLiberal Peace: Exploring Hybridity via Everyday Forms of Resistance, Agency, and Autonomy,” in
Hybrid forms of peace: From everyday agency to post-liberalism, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Audra
Mitchell (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Oliver P. Richmond, A
Post-Liberal Peace: The Infrapolitics of Peacebuilding (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2011).
2
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towards a vision of hybridity which acknowledges disparities in power and allows for
the prospect of conflicting meanings of the contested concept of ‘peace.’ Driving
transitional justice thought and practice in this direction would illuminate the space at
the margins of the field for the construction of new, emancipatory paradigms. It
would allow marginalized and subaltern populations to participate in the process of
knowledge and policy production. And, most importantly, it would eschew the
assumptions that force us to bound the possible universe of justice.
As transitional justice enters the ‘paradoxical moment of fieldhood’ where it
becomes self-critical and contesting voices clamor for inclusion, transitional justice is
presented with an opportunity.5 Instead of holding fast to the problematic assumptions
that led to field to a ‘premature midlife crisis,’ a critical reappraisal of transitional
justice thought and practice is in order.6 This requires more than an attempt to expand
the field in superficial or procedural ways, such as the inclusion of ‘local ownership,’
or a reorientation towards socioeconomic issues. This means more than the invention
of a new transitional justice mechanism, or the tailoring of an already existing one. It
entails a hollowing out of the flawed assumptions embedded in transitional justice
literature, including its goals, its desires and its methods. Bounding the limits of the
field, holding close its untenable assumptions and refusing to meet the demands of
reconstruction will likely lead to irrelevance and atrophy. If the goals of transitional
justice are to hold any true significance, we must constantly insist that transitional
justice act as a force for the dismantling of hegemonic structures, rather than the
vehicle for delivering them.

Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’”
13.
6
Ibid.
5
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